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CRIMINOLOGY 
“DEFUND THE (SCHOOL) POLICE”? 
BRINGING DATA TO KEY SCHOOL-TO-
PRISON PIPELINE CLAIMS 
MICHAEL HEISE AND JASON P. NANCE 
Nationwide calls to “Defund the Police,” largely attributable to the 
resurgent Black Lives Matter demonstrations, have motivated derivative 
calls for public school districts to consider “defunding” (or modifying) 
school resource officer (“SRO/police”) programs. To be sure, a school’s 
SRO/police presence—and the size of that presence—may influence the 
school’s student discipline reporting policies and practices. How schools 
report student discipline and whether that reporting involves referrals to law 
enforcement agencies matters, particularly as reports may fuel a growing 
“school-to-prison pipeline.” The school-to-prison pipeline research 
literature features two general claims that frame debates about changes in 
how public schools approach student discipline and the growing number of 
calls for schools to defund SRO/police programs. One claim is that public 
schools’ increasingly “legalized” approach toward student discipline 
increases the likelihood that students will be thrust into the criminal justice 
system. A second distributional claim is that these adverse consequences 
disproportionately involve students of color, boys, students from low-income 
households, and other vulnerable student sub-groups. Both claims implicate 
important legal and policy dimensions, as students’ adverse interactions with 
law enforcement agencies typically impose negative consequences on 
students and their futures. We study both claims using the nation’s leading 
data set on public school crime and safety, supplemented by data on state-
level mandatory reporting requirements and district-level per pupil 
 
 Michael Heise is the William G. McRoberts Professor in the Empirical Study of Law at 
Cornell Law School; Jason P. Nance is a Professor at the University of Florida Levin College 
of Law. We are grateful to three anonymous referees for their helpful comments on an earlier 
version of this Article. Author correspondence: michael.heise@cornell.edu. 
718 HEISE & NANCE [Vol. 111 
spending, and explore three distinct analytic approaches in an effort to 
assess the independent influence of a school’s SRO/police presence on that 
school’s student discipline reporting behavior. Results from our analyses 
provide mixed support for the two claims. We find that a school’s SRO/police 
presence corresponds with an increased likelihood that the school will report 
student incidents to law enforcement agencies. However, we do not find 
support in the school-level data for the distributional claim. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While it is not clear at this juncture which lasting legal and policy 
changes may emerge from recent and ongoing efforts to “Defund the Police,” 
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attributable to the resurgent Black Lives Matters movement,1 one specific 
change is already clear: a growing number of public school districts are now 
confronting related demands to “defund” school resource officer 
(“SRO/police”) programs that operate in one-half of the nation’s public 
elementary and secondary schools.2 Despite a sustained growth in 
SRO/police presence in public elementary and secondary schools over time, 
much remains unknown about the full suite of costs and benefits for students, 
schools, and families attributable to these programs.3 What remains all but 
assumed amid this uncertainty, however, is that a school’s SRO/police 
presence helps fuel a “school-to-prison pipeline.”4 
The growing school-to-prison pipeline research literature features two 
general claims that frame key debates about how public schools approach 
student discipline. One claim is that schools’ student discipline practices 
 
 1 See, e.g., #DefundThePolice, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/defu
ndthepolice/ [https://perma.cc/39CA-66PV] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021); Lissandra Villa, Why 
Protesters Want to Defund Police Departments, TIME (June 7, 2020, 11:17 AM), 
https://time.com/5849495/black-lives-matter-defund-police-departments/ [https://perma.cc/G
L39-JDJ2]; Rachel Hatzipanagos, What ‘Defund the Police’ Might Look Like, WASH. POST 
(June 12, 2020, 11:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/12/black-lives-
matter-defund-police-is-country-ready/ [https://perma.cc/9QZW-9EAE]. 
 2 See, e.g., Nader Issa, Northside College Prep Votes to Remove Its CPD Officer, Becomes 
First CPS School To Do So, CHI. SUN-TIMES (July 8, 2020, 7:59 PM), https://chicago.sun
times.com/education/2020/7/8/21316997/northside-college-prep-removes-chicacgo-police-
officer-first-cps-school [https://perma.cc/7NQQ-E9B7]; Ella Torres, Calls to Defund Police 
Shine Light on the School-to-Prison Pipeline, ABC NEWS (June 18, 2020, 5:24 AM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/calls-defund-police-shine-light-school-prison-pipeline/story?id=
71195676 [https://perma.cc/9TTQ-ZNUK]; Katie Reilly, ‘Police Do Not Belong in Our 
Schools.’ Student Are Demanding an End to Campus Cops After the Death of George Floyd, 
TIME (June 5, 2020, 12:26 PM), https://time.com/5848959/school-contracts-police/ 
[https://perma.cc/2YQT-8EQQ]; Jessica Swarner, While the Push to Defund Phoenix Police 
Grows Stronger, Activists Want Officers Out of Schools, COPPER COURIER (June 16, 2020, 
10:44 AM), https://coppercourier.com/story/students-demand-remove-police-school-campus-
phoenix/ [https://perma.cc/A4CX-ZTKV]. 
 3 See Jason P. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 93 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 919, 952 (2016) (observing the difficulty of measuring the effects of laws, practices, 
and policies, including having law enforcement officers in schools, on students); Mario S. 
Torres Jr. & Jacqueline A. Stefkovich, Demographics and Police Involvement: Implications 
for Student Civil Liberties and Just Leadership, 45 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 450, 450, 468 (2009) 
(examining the relationship between the use of law enforcement officers in schools and 
criminalizing student offenses and discussing possible explanations for paradoxical findings); 
Chongmin Na & Denise C. Gottfredson, Police Officers in Schools: Effects on School Crime 
and the Processing of Offending Behaviors, 30 JUST. Q. 619, 645 (2013) (concluding that 
“more rigorous research” on the effects of police officers in schools is “absolutely essential”). 
 4 See, e.g., Jason P. Nance, Dismantling the Schools-to-Prison Pipeline: Tools For 
Change, 48 ARIZ. L.J. 313, 338 (2016) (describing various causes contributing to the 
emergence of a school-to-prison pipeline). 
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have become increasingly legalized.5 A steadily increasing SRO/police 
presence in the nation’s public schools both contributes to, and reflects, this 
trend.6 Aside from an array of factors that help account for an increased 
SRO/police presence in public schools, schools’ evolving posture towards 
student discipline raises important policy concerns. An increasingly legalized 
school environment may contribute to a net increase in overall school safety 
and a concurrent decrease in school violence.7 Even if such benefits are 
realized, important potential costs also lurk. Absent a truly randomized and 
controlled experiment, efforts to assess and weigh the benefits and costs 
associated with schools’ increasingly legalized approach toward student 
discipline impose significant demands on potential research designs. 
Notwithstanding important research design challenges, much of the 
public and scholarly attention to schools’ evolving posture toward student 
discipline dwells on the possible negative spill-over effects imposed on 
students, their families, and schools.8 One potential cost that has attracted 
particular scholarly (and public) attention involves students’ increased 
exposure to the criminal justice system.9 Given the important stakes 
involved, concerns about adverse implications for individual students and 
their futures attributable to an increasingly legalized student discipline model 
are important and warrant careful attention. This is especially so if schools’ 
motivations for this policy shift include a desire to functionally out-source a 
greater share of responsibility for student discipline to law enforcement 
agencies. Making matters worse is that referrals of student incidents to law 
enforcement agencies—particularly for lower-level non-violent student 
incidents that were traditionally handled internally within schools—often set 
into motion a series of legal events that can culminate in ways that 
 
 5 See Henry A. Giroux, Racial Injustice and Disposable Youth in the Age of Zero 
Tolerance, 16 QUALITATIVE STUD. IN EDUC. 553, 557 (2003); Paul J. Hirschfield, Preparing 
for Prison?: The Criminalization of School Discipline in the USA, 12 THEORETICAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 79, 88 (2008). 
 6 See, e.g., Nance, supra note 3, at 969–70 (using 2009–2010 School Survey on Crime 
and Safety (“SSOCS”) data); Torres Jr. & Stefkovich, supra note 3, at 461, 463 (analyzing 
1999–2000 SSOCS data); Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 637 (analyzing various SSOCS 
data sets). 
 7 See CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45251, SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 
6–8 (2018) (reviewing the research on whether school police programs reduce school violence 
and concluding that “[t]he research that is available draws conflicting conclusions”). 
 8 See supra note 2 (examples of recent public attention); supra note 3 (examples of recent 
scholarly work, especially empirical work). 
 9 See, e.g., Michael P. Krezmien, Peter E. Leone, Mark S. Zabloski & Craig S. Wells, 
Juvenile Court Referrals and the Public Schools: Nature and Extent of the Practice in Five 
States, 26 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 273, 275 (2010); Nance, supra note 3, at 953. 
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deleteriously impact students’ lives.10 Operationalizing this first general 
claim—that schools’ approach to student discipline is becoming increasingly 
legalized—contributes to the following hypothesis: SRO/police presence (no 
matter how small or large) at a school corresponds with an increase in the 
likelihood that the school will report student discipline incidents to law 
enforcement agencies. A related, though distinct, form of this hypothesis is 
that as a school’s SRO/police presence increases so too does the likelihood 
that the school will report student discipline incidents to law enforcement 
agencies. 
Persuaded that policy costs associated with schools’ increasingly 
legalized approach to student discipline outweigh the benefits, many critics 
quickly advance a second general claim: such a policy’s costs distribute 
unequally across various traditional sub-groups of students.11 Thus, a second 
hypothesis—an extension of the first—is that a school’s referrals of student 
disciplinary incidents to law enforcement agencies disproportionately 
involve students of color, boys, students from low-income households, and 
other vulnerable student sub-groups. 
Despite both claims having already secured general acceptance in the 
school-to-prison pipeline literature, we find mixed empirical support when 
these two claims are subjected to the nation’s leading cross-sectional data set 
on public school crime and safety, the U.S. Department of Education’s 2015–
2016 School Survey on Crime and Safety (“SSOCS”).12 With respect to the 
first claim, we find evidence that a school’s SRO/police presence 
corresponds with an increased likelihood that the school will report student 
incidents to law enforcement agencies.13 Our finding on this first claim 
generally comports with prior studies that analyze earlier versions of the 
SSOCS data set.14 
 
 10 See infra Part I.A.3. 
 11 See, e.g., Janel George, Populating the Pipeline: School Policing and the Persistence 
of the School-To-Prison Pipeline, 40 NOVA L. REV. 493, 494 (2016) ( “[C]hildren of color and 
low-income children . . . are disproportionately targeted for referral and arrest by police in 
schools.”); Amanda Merkwae, Schooling the Police: Race, Disability, and the Conduct of 
School Resource Officers, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 147, 180 (2015) (concluding that “there is 
overwhelming evidence suggesting that students of color and students with disabilities are 
funneled into the justice system due to the disparate impact of exclusionary discipline polices 
and discretionary arrests in schools”); Matthew T. Theriot, School Resource Officers and the 
Criminalization of Student Behavior, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 280, 285–86 (2009) (finding evidence 
of a relation between school poverty levels and number of student arrests). 
 12 Various results discussed in this Article also derive from the 2009–2010 restricted-use 
version of the SSOCS data series. 
 13 See infra Parts III.A, III.B. 
 14 See, e.g., Nance, supra, note 3, at 969–70; Torres & Stefkovich, supra note 3, at 461–
63; Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 17–22. 
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At the same time, however, we do not find direct empirical support for 
the second claim: that school reports of student incidents to law enforcement 
agencies systematically distribute unevenly across various student sub-
groups.15 Direct evidence on this specific claim is simply not possible owing 
to the absence in the SSOCS data set of any individual-level demographic 
data (e.g., race/ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status) on students whose 
conduct triggered a school referral to law enforcement agencies. To be clear, 
however, this hypothesis remains a viable possibility as supportive anecdotal 
and related evidence exists.16 
Our narrower point is that there is no direct empirical support from the 
SSOCS data set that school referrals to law enforcement raise troubling 
distributional issues.17 Moreover, the weight of the indirect evidence from 
school-level data similarly does not imply troubling distributional 
 
 15 See infra Parts III.A, III.B. 
 16 See, e.g., Nance, supra note 3, at 973 (noting that while the SSOCS data do not permit 
identification of the students who were actually referred to law enforcement, it remains 
“entirely possible” that the school referrals were “disproportionately students of color”); see 
also DANIEL J. LOSEN, NAT’L POLICY CTR., DISCIPLINE POLICIES, SUCCESSFUL SCHOOLS, AND 
RACIAL JUSTICE 6–7 (2011), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education
/school-discipline/discipline-policies-successful-schools-and-racial-justice [https://perma.cc/
7VDR-LKHB]; Catherine P. Bradshaw, Mary M. Mitchell, Lindsey M. O’Brennan & Philip 
J. Leaf, Multilevel Exploration of Factors Contributing to the Overrepresentation of Black 
Students in Office Disciplinary Referrals, 102 J. EDUC. PSYCH. 508, 508 (2010) (discovering 
that after controlling for teacher ratings of students’ behavior problems, Black students were 
more likely than White students to be referred to the office for disciplinary reasons); Michael 
Rocque & Raymond Paternoster, Understanding the Antecedents of the “School-to-Jail” 
Link: The Relationship Between Race and School Discipline, 101 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
633, 653–54 (2011) (documenting that Black students are more likely than White students to 
be disciplined even after taking into account other salient factors such as grades, attitudes, 
gender, special education or language programs, and their conduct in school). 
 17 We note that language in at least one published paper—using earlier versions of the 
SSOCS data set—invites some level of confusion by potentially advancing claims, albeit 
tentatively, about the disproportionate impacts on minority student sub-groups based on data 
on schools’ overall racial/ethnic, gender, and special education needs compositions. See Na & 
Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 641 (“We conclude that the results of our tests of interaction with 
percent in special education and percentage minority do not suggest a pattern of 
disproportionate impact of police use on socially or educationally disadvantaged 
populations.”). While perhaps such analyses provide not-implausible inferential support, 
without individual-level racial/ethnic, gender and special education needs data on the actual 
students referred to law enforcement agencies, more efficacious and helpful conclusions are 
simply not possible given the data limitations. Contributing to the confusion is that the Na & 
Gottfredson paper is aware of the unit of analysis limitation in the SSOCS data sets. See id. at 
641–42 (“However, finer-grained analyses conducted at the individual-level might uncover 
patterns that our school-level data could not.”). 
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outcomes.18 Notably, the paucity of supportive empirical evidence from our 
study generally contrasts with broader scholarly and public claims about 
uneven distributions of school discipline across various student sub-groups.19 
Our study of the relation between a school’s SRO/police presence and 
the school’s likelihood of referring student disciplinary incidents to law 
enforcement agencies seeks to contribute to the existing research literature in 
three specific ways. First, our analyses exploit a more recent (2015-16) 
version of the SSOCS data set.20 Second, our various models include such 
complementary data on state-level mandatory reporting requirements as well 
as district-level per pupil spending information.21 These complimentary data 
provide helpful, and perhaps essential, controls for any modeling efforts.22 
Third, we explore three distinct analytic approaches, including logistic 
regression, fractional response regression, and Heckman selection 
specifications in an effort to better isolate the possible independent influence 
 
 18 For similar results from earlier SSOCS data sets see, e.g., Nance, supra note 3, 972–73 
(analyzing 2009–2010 SSOCS data); Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 620, 626, 640–41 
(analyzing 2003–2004, 2005–2006, and 2007–2008 SSOCS data sets). See generally Michael 
Heise & Jason P. Nance, To Report or Not to Report: Data on Schools, Student Discipline, 
and the “School to Prison Pipeline,” (Cornell Law Sch. Rsch. Paper No. 20-39, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3677247 [https://perma.cc/8MEJ-
RSBA], for an extended discussion of possible reasons why student incidents reported to law 
enforcement do not distribute unevenly across student racial sub-groups, which is particularly 
surprising in light of substantial empirical support demonstrating that racial disparities persist 
in other areas of education, the criminal justice system, and society generally. 
 19 See, e.g., Erik J. Girvan, Towards A Problem-Solving Approach to Addressing Racial 
Disparities in School Discipline Under Anti-Discrimination Law, 50 MEM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3571488 [https://pe
rma.cc/93UB-FKHA] (providing an overview of racial disparities that exist in school 
exclusionary discipline); Russell J. Skiba, Robert S. Michael, Abra Carroll Nardo & Reece L. 
Peterson, The Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial and Gender Disproportionality in School 
Punishment, 34 URB. REV. 317, 319–20 (2002) (describing the overrepresentation of Black 
students in the administration of school discipline); John M. Wallace, Jr., Sara Goodkind, 
Cynthia M. Wallace & Jerald G. Bachman, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Differences in School 
Discipline Among U.S. High School Students: 1991-2005, 59 NEGRO EDUC. REV. 47, 47 (2008) 
(finding that Black, Hispanic, and American Indian students are more likely to be subject to 
exclusionary discipline than White and Asian American students); Jayanti Owens, Early 
Childhood Behavior Problems and the Gender Gap in Educational Attainment in the United 
States, 89 SOC. EDUC. 236, 253–54 (2016) (explaining that “[i]implicit stereotypes may lead 
to increased grade retention and disproportionately harsh discipline, such as school suspension 
or expulsion”); Lauren Camera, Boys Bear the Brunt of School Discipline, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT (June 22, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-06-22/boys-
bear-the-brunt-of-school-discipline [https://perma.cc/KU28-5U4T] (explaining that “the same 
behavior problems in boys and girls were penalized a lot more in boys than girls”). 
 20 See infra Part II.A. 
 21 See infra Part II.D.1. 
 22 See infra Part II.D.1. 
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of a school’s SRO/police presence along with the magnitude of that presence 
on a school’s student discipline reporting behavior.23 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly summarizes the relevant 
research literatures. Part II describes our data and empirical strategy. We 
present our results in Part III and consider their legal and policy implications. 
We conclude in Part IV and discuss possible next steps for subsequent 
research. 
I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While our Article seeks to both build on and extend the relevant 
empirical literature, it also inevitably brushes up against two other related 
research literatures that supply much needed analytic context. One such 
literature seeks to explain the tightened intersections between schools and the 
criminal justice system over the past few decades. A second, related research 
literature endeavors to understand SRO/police officers’ increased role in 
public schools and the consequences of this change. 
A. THE TIGHTENED INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN SCHOOLS AND THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
1. Evidence of Tightened Intersections Between Schools and the Criminal 
Justice System 
Over the last few decades intersections between schools and the 
criminal justice system have tightened significantly.24 This trend can be 
conceptualized in at least two ways. First, schools have increased their 
reliance on various criminal justice oriented measures designed to intensify 
student surveillance and deter violence and student wrongdoing.25 For 
example, during the 2017–2018 school year, 83.5% of surveyed schools 
reported that they used one or more security cameras to monitor students.26 
This was a sizeable increase from the 1999–2000 school year, in which only 
 
 23 See infra Parts II.D, II.E. 
 24 See generally Jason P. Nance, The Intersection Between Schools and the Criminal 
Justice System, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW 665–700 (James G. Dwyer 
ed., 2020). 
 25 See Kelly Welch, School-to-Prison Pipeline, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE 1, 1–2 (Christopher J. Schreck ed., 2017). 
 26 MELISSA DILIBERTI, MICHAEL JACKSON, SAMUEL CORREA, ZOE PADGETT & RACHEL 
HANSEN, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CRIME, VIOLENCE, 
DISCIPLINE, AND SAFETY IN U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS: FINDINGS FROM THE SCHOOL SURVEY ON 
CRIME AND SAFETY: 2017–18, at 13 (2019). 
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19.4% of schools indicated that they used security cameras.27 Also during the 
2017–2018 school year, 95.4% of surveyed schools controlled access to 
school buildings by locking or monitoring their doors (up from 74.6% in 
1999–2000), 50.8% controlled access to school grounds by locking or 
monitoring gates (up from 33.7% in 1999–2000), and 27.8% conducted one 
or more “random sweeps for contraband” (up from 11.8% in 1999–2000).28 
As discussed in more detail below, schools also have increasingly relied on 
SRO/police officers in recent years to monitor students and deter violence 
and criminal activity. Notably, many schools rely on various combinations 
of these measures that, some argue, contribute to a quasi-prison-like 
environment.29 
Second, as a consequence of these tightened intersections between 
schools and the criminal justice system, more students are becoming 
involved with the criminal justice system, either as youth or when they reach 
adulthood.30 Contributing to this are policies and practices, including state 
statutes that require schools to notify law enforcement agencies when 
students engage in certain wrongful acts. For example, states require schools 
to report students to law enforcement when students commit violent acts such 
as sexual assault31 and attacking another student with a weapon.32 Several 
states also require schools to report students to law enforcement for various 
nonviolent crimes, such as possession of illegal drugs,33 possession of 
 
 27 JILL F. DEVOE, KATHARIN PETER, MARGARET NOONAN, THOMAS D. SNYDER & KATRINA 
BAUM, NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME 
AND SAFETY: 2005, at 106 (2005). 
 28 See id.; DILIBERTI, JACKSON, CORREA, PADGETT & HANSEN, supra note 26, at 13 tbl.7. 
Interestingly, fewer schools indicated that they performed one or more random metal detector 
checks on students during the 2017–2018 school year (4.9%) than during the 1999–2000 
school year (7.2%). DEVOE, PETER, NOONAN, SNYDER & BAUM, supra note 27, at 106; 
DILBERTI, JACKSON, CORREA, PADGETT & HANSEN, supra note 26, at 13 tbl.7. However, more 
schools required students to pass through metal detectors on a daily basis (0.9% during 1999–
2000 vs. 2.2% during 2017–2018). DEVOE, PETER, NOONAN, SNYDER & BAUM, supra note 27, 
at 106; DILBERTI, JACKSON, CORREA, PADGETT & HANSEN, supra note 26, at 13. 
 29 See Jason P. Nance, Implicit Racial Bias and Students’ Fourth Amendment Rights, 94 
IND. L.J. 47, 48–52 (2019); Paul J. Hirschfield, Preparing for Prison? The Criminalization of 
School Discipline in the USA, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 79, 79–85 (2008). 
 30 See Nance, supra note 4, at 321–324; Nance, supra note 3, at 955–56. 
 31 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341(A)(30) (2018); FLA. STAT. § 1012.799 
(2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-288(g) (2018). 
 32 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17-113(b)(1) (2018); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48902(a) 
(West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, § 4112(b)(3) (2021). 
 33 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-1-24.1 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1184(a)(7), (b) (2018); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.154 (West 2018). 
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alcohol,34 theft,35 and vandalism.36 Other states require schools to report 
students to law enforcement for the commission of any felony or 
misdemeanor.37 
State statutes that criminalize adolescent misbehavior in schools also 
increase the likelihood of student engagement with the criminal justice 
system. For example, many states have passed so-called “disturbing school 
statutes,”38 which criminalize ordinary student misbehavior such as burping 
in class39 or texting in class and refusing to turn over a cell phone.40 Some 
estimate that thousands of students are charged each year for violating these 
statutes.41 Moreover, school exclusionary disciplinary practices, including 
suspension and expulsion, often are associated with increased student 
involvement with the criminal justice system.42 When students are not in 
school, they are more likely to be left at home unsupervised, which can 
sometimes lead to involvement in criminal activity.43 
Empirical studies also document the strong relationship that exists 
between exclusionary discipline practices in schools and students’ 
 
 34 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 33-210(1) (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-267 (2018); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 6A:16-6.4(a)(3)(i)–(ii) (West 2018). 
 35 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1002(1)(b) (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-
D:4(I) (2018); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1303A(b)(4.1) (2018). 
 36 E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.154 (2018); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1303A 
(2018)(b)(4.1). 
 37 E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.130(b)(2) (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6143(b)(1) 
(2018); MD. CODE REGS. 13A.08.01.15 (2018). 
 38 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2911(A)(1)(a)–(b) (2018); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 415.5(a)(1) (West 2018); FLA. STAT. § 871.01(1) (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.635.030 
(2018); see also Josh Gupta-Kagan, The School-to-Prison Pipeline’s Legal Architecture: 
Lessons from the Spring Valley Incident and Its Aftermath, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 83, 103–
04 (2017). 
 39 See A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1129–30 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 40 See G.M. ex rel. B.M. v. Casalduc, 982 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1240 (D.N.M. 2013). 
 41 See Amanda Ripley, How America Outlawed Adolescence, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/11/how-america-outlawed-adolescence/
501149/ [https://perma.cc/PQX3-Y7WK]; Gupta-Kagan, supra note 38, at 103. 
 42 See TONY FABELO, MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, MARTHA PLOTKIN, DOTTIE CARMICHAEL, 
MINER P. MARCHBANKS III & ERIC A. BOOTH, JUST. CTR. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’T & PUB. 
POL’Y RESEARCH INST., BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A STATEWIDE STUDY OF HOW STUDENT 
DISCIPLINE RELATES TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT 70 (2011), 
https://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/Breaking_School_Rules.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MSV8-ZEFE]. 
 43 See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Policy Statement: Out-of-School Suspension and 
Expulsion, 112 PEDIATRICS 1206, 1207 (2003). 
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involvement with the criminal justice system as adults.44 Students suspended 
in school were more likely to be arrested at some future point than those who 
were not suspended, even after controlling for other variables that might 
explain increased odds of arrest.45 School exclusionary discipline practices 
also correspond with academic underachievement and failing to graduate 
from high school;46 and failing to graduate from high school is associated 
with involvement in the criminal justice system, either as a youth or as an 
adult.47 
One extreme category of exclusionary discipline that has received 
considerable national attention are so-called “zero tolerance” policies. The 
Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994 required state legislatures to pass statutes that 
expelled students for at least one year for bringing a firearm on school 
campus as a condition for receiving federal education funds.48 The Act 
validated the practice of zero tolerance for certain student infractions and 
precipitated a new disciplinary mindset in many school districts across the 
 
 44 See Thomas Mowen & John Brent, School Discipline as a Turning Point: The 
Cumulative Effect of Suspension on Arrest, 53 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 628, 642–43 
(2016); Kerrin C. Wolf & Aaron Kupchik, School Suspension and Adverse Experiences in 
Adulthood, 34 JUST. Q. 407, 421–22 (2017); Tracey L. Shollenberger, Racial Disparities in 
School Suspension and Subsequent Outcomes: Evidence from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth, in CLOSING THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP: EQUITABLE REMEDIES FOR 
EXCESSIVE EXCLUSION 31, 36–40 (Daniel J. Losen ed., 2015). 
 45 Mowen & Brent, supra note 44, at 642–43; Wolf & Kupchik, supra note 44, at 421–22. 
 46 See, e.g., FABELO, THOMPSON, PLOTKIN, CARMICHAEL, MARCHBANKS & BOOTH, supra 
note 42, at 54–59 (finding that students experiencing exclusionary discipline, who otherwise 
had statistically identical profiles to those who had not experienced exclusionary discipline, 
were more likely to drop out of school); Robert Balfanz, Vaughan Byrnes & Joanna Fox, Sent 
Home and Put Off-Track: The Antecedents, Disproportionalities, and Consequences of Being 
Suspended in the Ninth Grade, 5 J. APPLIED RSCH. ON CHILDREN 1, 9 (2014) (finding that, after 
controlling for course performance, attendance, and student demographics, a single 
suspension in the ninth grade increased the odds of dropping out of school from 16% to 32%, 
and each additional suspension increased the odds by 20%); see also Jeffery H. Lamont, Am. 
Acad. of Pediatrics, Policy Statement: Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion, 131 
PEDIATRICS e1000, e1001 (2013) (“[S]tudents who experience out-of-school suspension and 
expulsion are as much as 10 times more likely to ultimately drop out of high school than are 
those who do not.”). 
 47 See NAT’L CTR. JUV. JUST., JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2014 NATIONAL REPORT 
15 (Melissa Sickmund & Charles Puzzanchera eds., 2014), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstat
bb/nr2014 [https://perma.cc/SFJ2-NU5B] (explaining that high school dropouts are more 
likely to be institutionalized than those who are more educated); CLIVE R. BELFIELD, HENRY 
M. LEVIN & RACHEL ROSEN, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF OPPORTUNITY YOUTH 20 (2012), 
https://aspencommunitysolutions.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Economic_Value_of_Op
portunity_Youth_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5QK-ACCN] (observing that “[e]ducation 
levels are strongly correlated with criminal activity”). 
 48 20 U.S.C. § 7961. 
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nation.49 Zero tolerance policies require school authorities to administer 
specific disciplinary consequences when students engage in certain behavior, 
regardless of the surrounding circumstances, the severity, or the results of the 
behavior.50 These policies now extend beyond bringing a gun to campus and 
apply to infractions like possession of illegal drugs, tobacco, alcohol, sharp 
objects, or over-the-counter medication, dress code violations, tardiness, 
truancy, and fighting.51 Zero tolerance policies have led to severe disciplinary 
consequences for behavior such as bringing cough drops, fingernail clippers, 
scissors, squirt guns, and pocketknives to school, drawing a picture of a 
weapon, authoring a violent story, and pretending to shoot a gun with one’s 
hands.52 Scholars and youth advocates have criticized zero tolerance policies 
as ineffective, counterproductive, and unnecessarily putting students at risk 
of increased involvement with the criminal justice system.53 
Significantly, many scholars and commentators also have pointed out 
that the tightened intersections between schools and the criminal justice 
system impact various student groups differently. For example, studies imply 
that schools serving higher concentrations of students of color have 
comparatively greater rates of employing various combinations of 
surveillance measures.54 These findings persist even after controlling for 
 
 49 See Udi Ofer, Criminalizing the Classroom: The Rise of Aggressive Policing and Zero 
Tolerance in New York City Public Schools, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1373, 1376 (2012) 
(“Passage of the Gun-Free Schools Act signaled an important validation of zero tolerance 
school discipline practices by the federal government . . . .”). 
 50 Am. Psych. Ass’n Zero Tolerance Task Force, Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in 
Schools? An Evidentiary Review and Recommendations, 63 AM. PSYCH. 852, 852 (2008). 
 51 See CATHERINE Y. KIM, DANIEL J. LOSEN & DAMON T. HEWITT, THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON 
PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 79–80 (2010) (describing the expansion of zero 
tolerance policies beyond expulsions for possessing firearms); DEREK W. BLACK, ENDING 
ZERO TOLERANCE: THE CRISIS OF ABSOLUTE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 3 (2016). 
 52 See BLACK, supra note 51, at 2–4. 
 53 See Am. Psych. Ass’n Zero Tolerance Task Force, supra note 50, at 857; Derek W. 
Black, The Constitutional Limit of Zero Tolerance in Schools, 99 MINN. L. REV. 823, 837–41 
(2015); ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE 




 54 See Jason P. Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial Bias, 
66 EMORY L.J. 765, 810–11 (2017) [hereinafter Nance, Student Surveillance] (finding that 
“higher concentrations of minority students are predictive of greater odds that schools rely 
on . . . designated combinations of security measures”); Jason P. Nance, Students, Security, 
and Race, 63 EMORY L.J. 1, 27–43 (2013) [hereinafter Nance, Students, Security, and Race] 
(finding that “a school’s percentage of minority students is a strong predictor of whether a 
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other school characteristics and student demographic information such as 
student poverty, the percentage of students performing poorly on academic 
assessments, school crime, school disorder and disciplinary problems, and 
school administrators’ perceptions of the level of criminal activity in the 
surrounding neighborhoods.55 
Likewise, scholars have written extensively about racial disparities in 
suspensions and expulsions.56 Similar to the use of security measures, many 
scholars find that racial disparities persist after controlling for factors such as 
student misbehavior, poverty, academic achievement, neighborhood context, 
and district and school characteristics.57 However, other scholars have 
observed that these uneven distributions of school discipline across various 
student sub-groups are complex. For example, empirical studies show that 
 
school uses a combination of strict security measures”); see also Jeremy D. Finn & Timothy 
J. Servoss, Security Measures and Discipline in American High Schools, in CLOSING THE 
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP: EQUITABLE REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE EXCLUSION 44, 49 (Daniel J. 
Losen ed., 2015) [hereinafter Finn & Servoss, Security Measures] (“[T]he percentage of Black 
students enrolled was more highly related to security levels than was any other 
characteristic.”); Timothy J. Servoss & Jeremy D. Finn, School Security: For Whom and with 
What Results?, 13 LEADERSHIP & POLICY IN SCHS. 61, 79–80 (2014) [hereinafter Servoss & 
Finn, School Security] (“In sum, a high proportion of Black students in a school is related to 
the degree of security the school implements above and beyond all other characteristics we 
studied.”); Katarzyna T. Steinka-Fry, Benjamin W. Fisher & Emily Tanner-Smith, Visible 
School Security Measures Across Diverse Middle and High School Settings: Typologies and 
Predictors, 11 J. APPLIED SEC. RSCH. 422, 424 (2016) (finding that a school’s use of intense 
security measures was associated with serving higher concentrations of African American and 
low-income students). 
 55 Nance, Student Surveillance, supra note 54, at 805–11; Nance, Students, Security, and 
Race, supra note 54, at 32–41; Finn & Servoss, Security Measures, supra note 54, at 49; 
Servoss & Finn, School Security, supra note 54, at 431. 
 56 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFF. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION 
DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 7 (2014); Russell J. Skiba, Mariella I Arredondo & 
Natasha T. Williams, More Than a Metaphor: The Contribution of Exclusionary Discipline to 
a School-to-Prison Pipeline, 47 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE EDUC. 546, 550–51 (2014); DANIEL J. 
LOSEN & JONATHAN GILLESPIE, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF 
DISCIPLINARY EXCLUSION FROM SCHOOL 12, 18–19 (2012); Girvan, supra note 19, at 5–7. 
 57 See Yolanda Anyon, Jeffrey M. Jenson, Inna Altschul, Jordan Farrar, Jeanette 
McQueen, Eldridge Greer, Barbara Downing & John Simmons, The Persistent Effect of Race 
and the Promise of Alternatives to Suspension in School Discipline Outcomes, 44 CHILD. & 
YOUTH SERV. REV. 379, 380 (2014); Russell J. Skiba, Robert H. Horner, Choong-Geun Chung, 
M. Karega Rausch, Seth L. May & Tary Tobin, Race Is Not Neutral: A National Investigation 
of African American and Latino Disproportionality in School Discipline, 40 SCH. PSYCH. 85, 
95–101 (2011); Russell J. Skiba, Choong-Geun Chung, Megan Trachok, Timberly Baker, 
Adam Sheya & Robin Hughes, Where Should We Intervene? Contributions of Behavior, 
Student, and School Characteristics in Out-of-School Suspension, in CLOSING THE SCHOOL 
DISCIPLINE GAP: EQUITABLE REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE DISCIPLINE 132, 132–34 (Daniel J. 
Losen ed., 2015). 
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Black students are not subject to exclusionary discipline at higher rates than 
other students for more serious and objectively defined offenses, especially 
when discipline is mandated for engaging in such offenses.58 But Black 
students are suspended and expelled at higher rates for less serious offenses 
and for offenses where discipline is discretionary.59 
Much less has been written about racial disparities in referrals to law 
enforcement or school-based arrests. Data from the U.S. Department of 
Education Office for Civil Rights’ Civil Rights Data Collection report racial 
disproportionalities at a national level,60 and others have used these data to 
document disparities at a state level,61 but comparatively less empirical work 
in this area has been conducted at the school level. 
One exception includes empirical work from Matthew Theriot, who 
“compared the number of arrests in three consecutive school years at thirteen 
schools with an SRO and fifteen schools without an SRO in one school 
district.”62 Theriot found that economic disadvantage in schools was 
positively related to the number of school-based arrests.63 He also found that 
 
 58 See FABELO, THOMPSON, PLOTKIN, CARMICHAEL, MARCHBANKS & BOOTH, supra note 
42, at 45; Erik J. Girvan, Cody Gion, Kent McIntosh & Keith Smolkowski, The Relative 
Contribution of Subjective Office Referrals to Racial Disproportionality in School Discipline, 
32 SCH. PSYCH. Q. 392, 400–402 (2017); see also Girvan, supra note 19, at 11–12 (discussing 
studies showing that Black students tend to be disciplined more often when discipline is 
discretionary for more minor offenses rather than when discipline is mandatory for more 
serious offenses). 
 59 See FABELO, THOMPSON, PLOTKIN, CARMICHAEL, MARCHBANKS & BOOTH, supra note 
42, at 45; Girvan, Gion, McIntosh & Smolkowski, supra note 58, at 397; Girvan, supra note 
19, at 11-12; Keith Smolkowski, Erik J. Girvan, Kent McIntosh, Rhonda N. T. Nese & Robert 
H. Horner, Vulnerable Decision Points for Disproportionate Office Discipline Referrals: 
Comparisons of Discipline for African American and White Elementary School Students, 41 
BEHAV. DISORDERS 178, 184 (2016). 
 60 See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFF. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DATA COLLECTION DATA SNAPSHOT: 
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 1, 6 (2014) (“Black students represent 16% of student enrollment, 27% of 
students referred to law enforcement, and 31% of students subjected to a school-related 
arrest.”); see also Emily M. Homer & Benjamin W. Fisher, Police in Schools and Student 
Arrest Rates Across the United States: Examining Differences by Race, Ethnicity, and Gender, 
19 J. SCH. VIOLENCE 192, 198–199 (2020) (examining the 2013–2014 Civil Rights Data 
Collection and finding that “Black students’ arrest rates were higher . . . by 1.22 students per 
1,000,” and “Hispanic students’ arrest rates were higher by 0.55 students per 1,000” in schools 
with police). 
 61 See, e.g., Evie Blad & Alex Harwin, Black Students More Likely to Be Arrested at 
School, EDUC. WEEK (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/01/25/black-
students-more-likely-to-be-arrested.html?r=1131109146 [https://perma.cc/MAK2-66LE] 
(stating that “[i]n 43 states and the District of Columbia, black students are arrested at school 
at disproportionately high levels”). 
 62 See Theriot, supra note 11, at 282. 
 63 Id. at 284. 
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“the number of arrests [did] not change as poverty levels change[d] at schools 
with an SRO.”64 
Another notable exception involves David Ramey’s analysis of data 
from the 2009–2010 U.S. Department of Education Civil Rights Data 
Collection and the 2009–2010 National Center for Education Statistics 
Common Core Data. Ramey examined, among other factors, the relationship 
between school-level and district-level racial/ethnic and poverty 
compositions and rates of referrals to law enforcement and school-based 
arrests.65 While Ramey’s study controls for demographics and school 
characteristics, it does not account for either state mandatory reporting 
requirements or examine the effect of schools having regular contact with an 
SRO or other law enforcement officer.66 Ramey found that schools serving 
higher concentrations of Black students were associated with higher rates of 
student arrests and referrals to law enforcement.67 He also found that schools 
and districts serving higher concentrations of impoverished students had 
higher rates of student criminalization.68 
Finally, F. Chris Curran and his colleagues examined the effects of SRO 
programs on students in two mid-sized suburban school districts in the South, 
including the frequency of student arrests.69 The school districts contained 
approximately fifty schools, all of which had an SRO.70 While the two 
districts generally served a student population that was mostly white and 
affluent, the schools’ student characteristics varied substantially with respect 
to race and ethnicity and socioeconomic status.71 Notably, these researchers 
“tended to see little variation in the practices of SROs across these schools.”72 
Specifically, they observed that “SROs tended to view the risk of threats and 
their approaches to school discipline similarly, regardless of the racial 
composition of the school.”73 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 See David M. Ramey, The Social Structure of Criminalized and Medicalized School 
Discipline, 88 SOC. EDUC. 181, 187 (2015). 
 66 See id. at 192. 
 67 Id. at 189, 192. 
 68 Id. at 192. 
 69 F. CHRIS CURRAN, BENJAMIN W. FISHER, SAMANTHA L. VIANO & AARON KUPCHIK, 
UNDERSTANDING SCHOOL SAFETY AND THE USE OF SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS IN 
UNDERSTUDIED SETTINGS 7, 32 (2020). 
 70 Id. at 7. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 33. 
 73 Id. 
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2. Why Intersections Between Schools and the Criminal Justice System 
Have Tightened 
Scholars have proposed several interrelated theories for why schools 
have increased their reliance on criminal justice-oriented security measures 
and punitive policies over the past decades. Some point to a backdrop of a 
“tough on crime” mindset that was present throughout various regions of the 
country and manifested by laws such as truth-in-sentencing laws,74 minimum 
prison sentence laws,75 and habitual offender laws.76 Consistent with this 
backdrop, when juvenile violent crime rates escalated from the mid-1980s to 
1994, many legislative and executive bodies focused on punishing criminal 
behavior rather than on rehabilitating youth offenders.77 Scholars argue that 
a parallel approach was adopted by schools to address student discipline 
problems, where some policymakers and school authorities focused on 
punishment, rather than rehabilitation, by suspending, expelling, or referring 
students to law enforcement when students violated school rules.78 
Scholars and commentators also observed that several highly-publicized 
acts of school violence, such as those that occurred at Columbine High 
School and Sandy Hook Elementary School, motivated many school 
authorities to intensify student surveillance and adopt punitive disciplinary 
 
 74 The majority of states in the 1980s and 1990s enacted statutes that mandated persons 
convicted of crimes to serve at least 85% of their prison sentences. See PAULA M. DITTON & 
DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: 
TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 3 (1999). 
 75 See, e.g., Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified 
as amended in various sections of 18 & 28 U.S.C.). 
 76 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (2012). 
 77 See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE 
COURT 189–90 (1999); PATRICIA TORBET, RICHARD GABLE, HUNTER HURST IV, IMOGENE 
MONTGOMERY, LINDA SZYMANSKI & DOUGLAS THOMAS, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST., STATE 
RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME, at xi (1996) (documenting states’ 
legislative and executive action shift in approach to address juvenile crime); Elizabeth S. Scott, 
“Children Are Different”: Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
71, 94 (2013) (“The hostility and fear that characterized attitudes toward young offenders in 
the 1990s resulted in policies and decisions driven primarily by immediate public safety 
concerns and the goal of punishing young criminals.”). For example, several states passed 
laws to facilitate the transfer of juveniles to criminal court to be tried as adults. See Donna M. 
Bishop & Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Justice in the Get Tough Era, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2766, 2768 (G. Bruinsma & D. Weisburd eds., 2014). 
 78 See KATHLEEN NOLAN, POLICE IN THE HALLWAYS: DISCIPLINE IN AN URBAN HIGH 
SCHOOL 164 (2011); Henry Armand Giroux, Racial Injustice and Disposable Youth in the Age 
of Zero Tolerance, 16 QUALITATIVE STUD. EDUC. 553, 561 (2003) (observing that zero 
tolerance policies were modeled on minimum prison sentences laws and habitual offender 
laws); Hirschfield, supra note 29, at 90; Barbara Fedders, The Anti-Pipeline Collaborative, 51 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565, 567–68 (2016). 
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policies.79 Such events, which commanded national attention for sustained 
periods of time, instilled fear and concern in many parents, students, and 
community members.80 School authorities and policymakers sometimes 
experienced pressure to demonstrate that they were creating safe 
environments for children.81 Security measures and “get tough” policies and 
practices were concrete actions that school authorities and policymakers 
could take to appease their constituencies. 
Scholars further theorize that some schools increased their reliance on 
intense surveillance measures and punitive discipline policies because they 
lack resources to adequately address student misbehavior and create orderly 
learning environments.82 Some students have severe learning disabilities, live 
in families that lack behavioral structure, have acute behavioral disorders, 
suffer from trauma, anxiety, malnutrition, lack adequate health care, live in 
neglectful, abusive home environments, and move frequently or are 
homeless.83 Students often misbehave or violate school rules when their 
needs are not met, they are harassed by their peers, or when they are 
frustrated or embarrassed because they cannot meet grade-level 
 
 79 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile 
Crime Regulation, 31 LAW & INEQ. 535, 541 (2013) (explaining that after the Columbine 
shootings “legislatures across the country rushed to pass strict zero tolerance laws, making it 
a crime to threaten violence in schools”); Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 54, 
at 3. 
 80 See Lynh Bui, Montgomery County Parents Ask for More School Security, Teacher 
Training During Budget Hearing, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2013, 3:15 PM), http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/blogs/maryland-schools insider/post/montgomery-county-parents-ask-for-m
ore-schoolsecurity-teacher-training-during-budget-hearing/2013/01/11/e8d3dcf4-5aab-11e2-
9fa9-5fbdc9530eb9_blog.html [https://perma.cc/TBE4-2P2E]; Motoko Rich, School Officials 
Look Again at Security Measures Once Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/education/after-newtown-shootings-schools-consider-
armed-security-officers.html [https://perma.cc/3KVN-9PW9]. 
 81 See Randall R. Beger, The “Worst of Both Worlds”: School Security and the 
Disappearing Fourth Amendment Rights of Students, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 336, 336 (2003); 
Torin Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres, Introduction, in SCHOOLS UNDER SURVEILLANCE: 
CULTURES OF CONTROL IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 1, 2–3 (Torin Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres 
eds., 2009) (“[T]he threat of ‘another Columbine’ (or Virginia Tech, and so on) haunts the 
social imagery, leading parents, policy makers, and others to the sober conclusion that any 
security measure is worth whatever trade-offs are involved in order to ensure safety.”). 
 82 See Pedro A. Noguera, Schools, Prisons, and Social Implications of Punishment: 
Rethinking Disciplinary Practices, 42 THEORY INTO PRACTICE 341, 342 (2003); Hirschfield, 
supra note 29, at 92. 
 83 See DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE PRIVATIZATION MOVEMENT 
AND THE DANGER TO AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 290–91 (2013); Linda Darling-Hammond, 
Inequality and School Resources: What It Will Take to Close the Opportunity Gap, in CLOSING 
THE OPPORTUNITY GAP: WHAT AMERICA MUST DO TO GIVE EVERY CHILD A CHANCE 77, 83 
(Prudence L. Carter & Kevin G. Welner eds., 2013). 
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expectations.84 Instead of addressing various unmet needs, some schools 
resort to referring students to law enforcement or relying on other 
exclusionary disciplinary measures designed to push misbehaving students 
out of school to help maintain order and control.85 
Relatedly, scholars also contend that increased pressure from external 
constituencies to demonstrate student achievement may be another driving 
force behind the adoption of punitive disciplinary measures and practices.86 
Over the last decades, federal and state education accountability laws, such 
as the now defunct No Child Left Behind Act, required schools to regularly 
test students to measure whether students met certain academic standards.87 
Schools failing to meet these imposed standards might be subject to various 
sanctions or receive a negative label, putting school authorities’ jobs in 
jeopardy.88 Pushing disruptive or low-performing students out of school 
could be a method to conserve limited resources to help schools meet 
statutory expectations and avoid sanctions. 
3. Consequences of These Tightened Intersections 
As previously explained, much of the public and scholarly attention 
focuses on individual and social costs flowing from more students becoming 
involved in the criminal justice system. Because such involvement can create 
adverse implications for students, their futures, their families, and society, 
concerns about these tightened intersections warrant careful attention. 
One end result for some youth who become involved in the criminal 
justice system is incarceration. Obviously, the impacts of incarceration on 
youth can be—and invariably are—severe. Incarceration for youth 
corresponds with (indeed, drives) limited future educational, employment, 
and housing opportunities,89 reduced odds of graduating from high school,90 
 
 84 See Noguera, supra note 82, at 342. 
 85 See Hirschfield, supra note 29, at 92; Noguera, supra note 82, at 342, 345. 
 86 See FED. ADVISORY COMM. ON JUVENILE JUST., ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 10 (2010); 
Linda Darling-Hammond, Race, Inequality and Educational Accountability: The Irony of ‘No 
Child Left Behind,’ 10 RACE, ETHNICITY, & EDUC. 245, 252–55 (2007); James E. Ryan, The 
Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 969–70 (2004). 
 87 See Nance, Student Surveillance, supra note 54, at 781–82. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See RIYA SAHA SHAH & JEAN STROUT, JUV. L. CTR., FUTURE INTERRUPTED: THE 
COLLATERAL DAMAGE CAUSED BY PROLIFERATION OF JUVENILE RECORDS 10–11 (2016); 
BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUST. POL’Y INST., THE DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE 
IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE FACILITIES 9 (2006). 
 90 See Anna Aizer & Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Juvenile Incarceration, Human Capital, and 
Future Crime: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 130 Q. J. ECON. 759, 799 (2015). 
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mental health concerns,91 a reinforcement of violent attitudes and 
behaviors,92 and an increased likelihood of future involvement in the criminal 
justice system.93 In addition, even student arrests that do not lead to 
incarceration correspond with undesirable conditions. An arrest can lead to 
emotional trauma, embarrassment, stigma, expulsion from school, and a 
reduced probability of graduating from high school.94 
B. A GROWING SRO/POLICE PRESENCE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
1. Evidence of and Explanations for a Growing SRO/Police Presence in 
Public Schools 
A key component of the tightened intersection between schools and the 
criminal justice system involves a growing SRO/police presence in public 
schools. Many schools rely on SRO/police officers to assist with student 
surveillance, deter school violence and student wrongdoing, and help create 
an orderly school environment.95 
 
 91 See Christopher B. Forrest, Ellen Tambor, Anne W. Riley, Margaret E. Ensminger & 
Barbara Starfield, The Health Profile of Incarcerated Male Youths, 105 PEDIATRICS 286, 288–
89 (2000); Javad H. Kashani, George W. Manning, Donald H. McKnew, Leon Cytryn, John 
F. Simonds & Phil C. Wooderson, Depression Among Incarcerated Delinquents, 3 
PSYCHIATRY RSCH. 185, 190–91 (1980). 
 92 See Anne M. Hobbs, Timbre Wulf-Ludden & Jenna Strawhun, Assessing Youth Early 
in the Juvenile Justice System, 3 J. JUV. JUST. 80, 81 (2013); Mark J. Van Ryzin & Thomas J. 
Dishion, From Antisocial Behavior to Violence: A Model for the Amplifying Role of Coercive 
Joining in Adolescent Friendships, 54 J. CHILD PSYCH. & PSYCHIATRY 661, 661 (2013) 
(explaining that coercive friendships during adolescent years predict violent behavior in 
adulthood). 
 93 See ANTHONY PETROSINO, CAROLYN TURPIN-PETROSINO & SARAH GUCKENBURG, 
FORMAL SYSTEM PROCESSING OF JUVENILES: EFFECTS ON DELINQUENCY 25–36 (2010); Brent 
B. Benda & Connie L. Tollett, A Study of Recidivism of Serious and Persistent Offenders 
Among Adolescents, 27 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 111, 113 (1999). 
 94 See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN: THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO 
JAILHOUSE TRACK 12 (2005); Theriot, supra note 11, at 281; Gary Sweeten, Who Will 
Graduate? Disruption of High School Education by Arrest and Court Involvement, 23 JUST. 
Q. 462, 471–77 tbl.5 (2006); Paul Hirschfield, Another Way Out: The Impact of Juvenile 
Arrests on High School Dropout, 82 SOC. EDUC. 368, 373 (2009). 
 95 In 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice sponsored a survey to identify the reasons why 
schools had SROs. See LAWRENCE F. TRAVIS III & JULIE KIERNAN COON, CTR. FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE RESEARCH, UNIV. OF CINCINNATI, THE ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN PUBLIC SCHOOL 
SAFETY: A NATIONAL SURVEY 85 (2005), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/2116
76.pdf. 42% of the principals surveyed indicated that “[n]ational media attention about school 
violence” was the primary reason; 17.5% indicated “[d]isorder problems (e.g., rowdiness, 
vandalism); 6.1% indicated that “[p]arents wanted an officer in the school;” 3.7% indicated 
that it was the “[l]evel of violence in the school;” and 48.2% indicated that it was for “[o]ther” 
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The National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO) 
believes that “[s]chool-based policing is the fastest-growing area of law 
enforcement.”96 Evidence documenting claims of a steadily growing police 
presence in public schools remains largely uncontested. While in the “late 
1970s” the total number of police officers assigned to public schools was 
fewer than 100,97 by 2007 the number approached almost 20,000.98 
Complementing the rapid growth in the raw number of SRO/police 
assigned to schools is the increasing percentage of schools that report a police 
presence. More precise estimates of this increase derive from SSOCS data 
sets. For example, 2007–2008 SSOCS data (weighted) reveal an SRO/police 
official was present at least one day a week in 21.1% of the sampled 
schools.99 The 2015–2016 SSOCS data set reveals that in less than one 
decade the percentage (50%) more than doubled.100 While both the absolute 
growth in SRO/police officers in schools as well as the relative share of 
schools that use them are well understood, reasons explaining these growth 
trends are comparatively less understood. Scholars observe that schools’ 
reliance on SRO/police has increased in tandem with reliance on criminal 
justice-oriented measures and punitive discipline policies for the reasons 
discussed above.101 Many point to rising youth crime rates from the mid-
1980s to 1994 and highly-publicized incidents of school violence as major 
driving forces for the increase.102 
 
reasons. Id. at 85; see also CURRAN, FISHER, VIANO & KUPCHIK, supra note 69, at 18–22 
(describing activities of SROs in schools). 
 96 About NASRO, NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RESOURCE OFFICERS, https://www.nasro.org/mai
n/about-nasro/ [https://perma.cc/4X5H-RV52] (last visited Mar. 2, 2021). 
 97 Nance, supra note 3, at 946; Kevin P. Brady, Sharon Balmer & Deinya Phenix, School-
Police Partnership Effectiveness in Urban Schools: An Analysis of New York City’s Impact 
Schools Initiative, 39 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y 455, 457 (2007); Paul J. Hirschfield & Katarzyna 
Celinska, Beyond Fear: Sociological Perspectives on the Criminalization of School 
Discipline, 5 SOC. COMPASS 1, 1 (2011). 
 98 See NATHAN JAMES & GAIL MCCALLION, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43126, SCHOOL 
RESOURCE OFFICERS: LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN SCHOOLS 20 (2013), https://fas.org/sgp
/crs/misc/R43126.pdf [http://perma.cc/5BJX-M43Z]. 
 99 Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 632–33. 
 100 See infra Part II.D.2, tbl.1 (displaying results from weighted sample). 
 101 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 102 See, e.g., CURRAN, FISHER, VIANO & KUPCHIK, supra note 69, at 16–17; Ben Brown, 
Evaluations of School Policing Programs, in THE PALGRAVE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF 
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE, SURVEILLANCE, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 327, 327 (Jo Deakin, Emmeline 
Taylor & Aaron Kupchik eds., 2018); Josh Gupta-Kagan, Reevaluating School Searches 
Following School-to-Prison Pipeline Reforms, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2013, 2015 (2019); 
Theriot, supra note 11, at 280. Following the school shooting in Parkland, Florida in 2018, the 
Florida State Legislature mandated that “each district school board and school district 
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Another likely source of this growth involves the availability of public 
funds to hire SRO/police officers. In the aftermath of the tragic shootings at 
Columbine High School the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of 
Community Policing Services initiated and implemented the “COPS in 
Schools” grant program in 1999.103 According to the most recent publicly-
available financial data, the COPS program has awarded around $914 million 
in grants to help hire more than 7,967 SROs.104 Additional federal funding 
sources include a collaborative effort involving the U.S. Departments of 
Justice, Education, and Health and Human Services. During its first decade 
(1999–2009), the resultant “Safe Schools/Healthy Students” program has 
provided more than $2.1 billion for an array of programs, including those that 
help fund SROs in schools.105 Several states also provide funding to support 
bringing SROs into schools.106 
Interestingly, lawmakers, police departments, and school officials 
continue to place more SRO/police into schools even though strikingly little 
is known about SRO/police programs’ effectiveness in terms of increasing 
school safety and decreasing school violence and crime.107 To be sure, it 
remains difficult to over-emphasize the benefits associated with increases in 
school safety and decreases in school violence and crime. Whether bolstering 
a school’s SRO/police presence in fact contributes to realizing such goals 
 
superintendent shall partner with law enforcement agencies or security agencies to establish 
or assign one or more safe-school officers at each school facility within the district . . . .” FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 1006.12 (2020). 
 103 Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 620–21. 
 104 MARIEKE BROCK, NORMA KRIGER & RAMÓN MIRÓ, LIBR. CONGR., SCHOOL SAFETY 
POLICIES AND PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY THE U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: 1990–2016 at 
78, 79, 81 (2017), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/251517.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q
U6S-Y66W]. 
 105 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of Education Awards More 
Than $32.8 Million to Promote Safe Schools, Healthy Students (July 10, 2009), 
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-awards-more-328-million-
promote-safe-schools-healthy-students [https://perma.cc/C3G5-7Y6G]; KELLIE ANDERSON, 
LAURA TOWVIM, JANE REPETTI, NIKITA CARNEY, JOHN ROSIAK, BENJAMIN THOMAS & 
CHRISTINE BLABER, SAFE SCHOOLS, HEALTHY STUDENTS, NAT’L CTR. MENTAL HEALTH PROM. 
& YOUTH VIOLENCE PREV., EDUC. DEV. CTR., LAW ENFORCEMENT: SNAPSHOTS FROM THE SAFE 
SCHOOLS/HEALTHY STUDENTS INITIATIVE 11 (2013) (discussing Safe Schools/Healthy 
Students funding to hire SROs in schools). 
 106 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-15B-2.2 (2020) (allocating funding for “safety plans 
involving the use of metal detectors, other security devices, uniforms, school safety resource 
officers, or other personnel employed to provide a safe school environment.”); 24 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 13-1302-A (2020) (authorizing grants to cover costs associated with compensating 
school resource officers). 
 107 See JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 98, at 9; see also Na & Gottfredson, supra note 
3, at 624–25 (criticizing most evaluations of SRO programs as limited to descriptive statistics 
and various self-reported perceptions of school and student safety). 
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remains uncertain, but evidence of possible negative costs attributable to a 
school’s SRO/police presence is comparatively less uncertain and, in any 
event, warrants attention. 
The precise roles, responsibilities, and day-to-day work of SRO/police 
officers vary considerably across the nation and from school to school. As 
Ben Brown observes, the American law enforcement apparatus itself is 
“decentralized and fragmented,” being composed of various federal, state, 
and local agencies that report to various constituencies and have differing 
responsibilities, authorities, and funding sources.108 A relatively small group 
of SRO/police is embedded within this fragmented apparatus and works for 
a variety of agencies that include county sheriff departments, municipal 
police departments, and school district police departments.109 Scholars who 
have studied SRO/police officer programs have observed a great variety and 
breadth of services that SRO/police provide to schools throughout the 
country.110 
Nevertheless, one common and unsurprising category of SRO/police 
activities that scholars and commentators consistently identify is “law 
enforcement-related activities,” including investigating complaints, 
minimizing disruptions, patrolling school grounds, and maintaining order.111 
SRO/police appear to have the legal authority to intervene in nearly all 
student disciplinary matters, as states commonly criminalize actions such as 
assault, disorderly conduct, larceny, and disturbing the peace.112 They also 
may enforce the so-called “disturbing school statutes” discussed above.113 
 
 108 See Brown, supra note 102, at 328–29. 
 109 Id. at 329. 
 110 See CURRAN, FISHER, VIANO & KUPCHIK, supra note 69, at 18–22; PETER FINN, 
MICHAEL SHIVELY, JACK MCDEVITT, WILLIAM LASSITER & TOM RICH, COMPARISON OF 
PROGRAM ACTIVITIES AND LESSONS LEARNED AMONG 19 SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER (SRO) 
PROGRAMS 14–18 (2005); AARON KUPCHIK, HOMEROOM SECURITY: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE IN AN 
AGE OF FEAR 82–95 (2010); TRAVIS III & COON, supra note 95, at 37–39; see also Brown, 
supra note 102, at 329–330. 
 111 See JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 98, at 2; KUPCHIK, supra note 110, at 83–89; 
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 102, at 2039; Theriot, supra note 11, at 281. According to the COPS 
program, one of the primary duties of SROs is to “address crime and disorder problems, gangs, 
and drug activities affecting or occurring in or around an elementary or secondary school.” 42 
U.S.C. § 3796dd-8(4)(A). 
 112 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 241 (West 2018) (criminalizing assault); FLA. STAT. 
§ 877.03 (2018) (criminalizing acts that breach the peace and disorderly conduct); N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 155.05 (McKinney 2018) (criminalizing larceny); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415 (2018) 
(criminalizing disorderly conduct). 
 113 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2911 (2018); CAL. PENAL CODE § 415.5 (West 
2018); FLA. STAT. § 871.01 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.635.030 (2018); see also Gupta-
Kagan, supra note 38, at 103; Kerrin C. Wolf, Arrest Decision Making by School Resource 
Officers, 12 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 137, 147 (2014). 
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Consequently, many scholars worry about the blurred lines that have 
emerged between “administering law enforcement” and “disciplining 
adolescent misbehavior.”114 One scholar observes that school resource 
officers have become the “new authoritative agents” of school discipline, as 
“the introduction of law enforcement officers into schools has transformed 
student misconduct into a matter to be dealt with by the criminal justice 
system.”115 
Scholars, particularly legal scholars, also have expressed concern that a 
sustained law enforcement presence in schools imposes additional strains on 
students’ already limited constitutional rights.116 For example, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that school authorities do not need to obtain a 
warrant or show probable cause to lawfully search a student.117 The majority 
of courts also have applied this lower standard when evaluating the legality 
of student searches conducted by SRO/police officers, even when evidence 
obtained from SRO searches subsequently is used for prosecution 
purposes.118 Courts also have held that school officials do not need to provide 
Miranda warnings before interrogating a student about potential 
wrongdoing,119 even when they subsequently provide the evidence they 
obtain to law enforcement,120 and even when a law enforcement officer is 
present during the interrogation.121 
 
 114 See, e.g., Gupta-Kagan, supra note 38, at 102–07; Kerrin C. Wolf, Assessing Students’ 
Civil Rights Claims Against School Resource Officers, 38 PACE L. REV. 215, 222–25 (2018); 
Fedders, supra note 78, at 573–74; Joseph B. Ryan, Antonis Katsiyannis, Jennifer M. Counts 
& Jill C. Shelnut, The Growing Concerns Regarding School Resources Officers, 53 
INTERVENTION SCH. & CLINIC 188, 188 (2018). 
 115 Ben Brown, Understanding and Assessing School Police Officers: A Conceptual and 
Methodological Comment, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 591, 591, 596 (2006). 
 116 See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 102, at 2015–18; Nance, supra note 3, at 936–40; 
Catherine Y. Kim, Policing School Discipline, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 861–65 (2012); 
Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to the Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment 
Standards in Public School Searches Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1067, 1067–70 (2003). 
 117 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–42 (1985). 
 118 See, e.g., People v. Dillworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill. 1996); R.D.S. v. State, 245 
S.W.3d 356, 367–69 (Tenn. 2008); see also Gupta-Kagan, supra note 102, at 2024–30. 
 119 See, e.g., C.S. v. Couch, 843 F. Supp. 2d 894, 917–20 (N.D. Ind. 2011); Boynton v. 
Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995, 997 (D. Me. 1982). 
 120 See, e.g., S.E. v. Grant Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 640–41 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 121 See, e.g., State v. J.T.D., 851 So. 2d 793, 797 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); In re Tateana 
R., 883 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477–78 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); J.D. v. Commonwealth, 591 S.E.2d 
721, 723–25 (Va. Ct. App. 2004). 
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2. Empirical Assessments of SRO/Police Presence in Schools 
Framed by research literatures that explore the concurrent growth of 
high stakes student discipline policies and the growing presence of 
SRO/police in schools, this Article seeks to directly engage with the related 
nascent empirical literature. We seek to explore the potential relationship 
between the presence of SRO/police in a school and that school’s likelihood 
of referring student discipline matters to law enforcement agencies. 
In earlier leading empirical work on this topic, one of the authors of this 
Article finds that “a police officer’s regular presence at a school is predictive 
of greater odds that school officials refer students to law enforcement . . . . 
including [for] seemingly minor offenses.”122 While Nance’s prior work 
remains important, it uses an earlier (2009–2010) SSOCS data set. Moreover, 
Nance’s earlier analyses rely on raw rather than weighted data, do not include 
per pupil spending information, and pursue slightly different empirical 
strategies than those pursued here. Any technical or coding adjustments 
notwithstanding, in many ways this Article seeks to update, expand, and 
build upon Nance’s earlier influential work. 
Other scholars have also exploited earlier versions of the SSOCS data 
set. Na and Gottfredson, for example, drew from the 2007–2008 SSOCS data 
set and found results that generally comport with Nance’s subsequent study 
finding a positive relation between the number of SRO/police officers at a 
school and that school’s likelihood of reporting student incidents to law 
enforcement.123 Unlike Nance’s study, however, Na and Gottfredson’s 
models do not control for factors as a state’s mandatory reporting 
requirements. Despite important methodological limitations, Na and 
Gottfredson went on to conclude, in part, that the addition of police officers 
in schools correlated with a move to “redefine disciplinary situations as 
criminal justice problems rather than social, psychological, or academic 
problems, and accordingly increases the likelihood that students are arrested 
at school.”124 Interestingly, as it relates to the “conventional wisdom” 
surrounding concerns with distributional issues incident to the school-to-
prison pipeline hypothesis, Na and Gottfredson found “no evidence of 
adverse impact of police officer presence on minority groups or on special 
education populations.”125 Of course, Na and Gottfredson’s conclusion 
pivots on school-level racial/ethnic (and other) data as opposed to student-
 
 122 Nance, supra note 3, at 927. 
 123 See Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 639, 640. It is perhaps worth noting that in 
supplemental analyses Na and Gottfredson drew on even earlier SSOCS data sets (2003–2004, 
2005–2006, 2007–2008). See Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 637. 
 124 Id. at 642. 
 125 Id. 
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level data on the actual students involved in school reports to law 
enforcement agencies. Indeed, Nance, using similar SSOCS data sets, 
concluded that strong distributional claims about school reporting practices 
were not prudent given the data limitations.126 
We have thus far not found any published article that focuses on a 
possible relationship between a school’s rate of reporting incidents to law 
enforcement officials and the presence—as well as magnitude—of law 
enforcement officials at the schools using the more recent 2015–2016 
SSOCS data set.127 We are similarly unaware of any published work that 
includes statistical controls for state reporting requirements and student per 
pupil spending. Finally, we are similarly unfamiliar with any published work 
that estimates selection models. 
II.  DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Our study uses the nation’s leading cross-sectional data set on public 
school crime and safety and supplements those data with complementary 
information from other leading and long-standing data sets. We test our 
various research hypotheses with three different, though related, empirical 
specifications. 
A. DATA 
The main source of data for this study draws from the U.S. Department 
of Education’s School Survey on Crime and Safety for the 2015–2016 school 
year (“SSOCS”).128 We use the restricted-access version of the SSOCS data 
set that benefits from more granular school-level counts of the number of 
student disciplinary incidents that schools reported to law enforcement 
 
 126 See Nance, supra note 3, at 973 (noting that while the SSOCS data do not permit 
identification of the students who were actually referred to law enforcement, it remains 
“entirely possible” that the school referrals were “disproportionately students of color”). 
 127 We want to acknowledge that the U.S. Department of Education has published a report 
that both promotes and summarizes a few variables from the SSOCS 2017–2018 data set. See 
generally DILIBERTI, JACKSON, CORREA, PADGETT & HANSEN, supra note 26. For a brief 
summary of some of the results published here see generally Michael Heise & Jason P. Nance, 
Following Data: The “Defund the Police” Movement’s Implications for Elementary and 
Secondary Schools, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY ONLINE 63 (2020). 
 128 Various results discussed in this Article also derive from the restricted-use version of 
the 2009–2010 SSOCS data series. SSOCS data sets dominate the empirical literature seeking 
to assess schools’ SRO/police presence influence on student referrals to law enforcement 
agencies. See, e.g., supra note 6. 
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agencies as well as the number of full- and part-time SRO/police officers at 
each school.129 
To construct its sample, drawn from the universe of American public K-
12 schools, the National Center for Education Statistics (“NCES”) used the 
2013–2014 school year Common Core of Data Public Elementary/Secondary 
School Universe File (“CCD”)130 to help ensure that the weighted SSOCS 
data set reflects a representative sample of American public K-12 schools.131 
Insofar as this study seeks information on “typical” or “regular” schools, 
those schools classified as something other than “regular” were excluded 
from analyses.132 Moreover, additional school-level data from the CCD were 
also used to develop various “framing” variables included in the SSOCS data 
set. The 2015–2016 SSOCS data set is the most recent in a periodic series 
 
 129 Institute of Education Science, Data Security Office, User License No.19110005. The 
public version of the SSOCS data set and codebook are available at 2015-2016 School Survey 
on Crime and Safety (SSOCS) Public-Use Data Files and Codebook, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2018109 [https://perma.cc/ZW5V-
AKRS] (last visited Mar. 5, 2021). The restricted-use version of the 2015–2016 SSOCS data 
set includes a greater level of detail in the data compared to public-use data files. See generally 
Statistical Standards Program: Getting Started, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 
https://nces.ed.gov/statprog/instruct_gettingstarted.asp [https://perma.cc/W7JE-WEEU] (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2021). Importantly, to align our study with previous studies our focus on 
SRO/police includes only school resource officers and other sworn law enforcement officials. 
Our focus on sworn law officials, therefore, excludes any security guards or other individual 
who may contribute to school safety but who are neither a sworn nor formally trained law 
enforcement official. 
 130 The Common Core of Data (CCD) “is an NCES annual census system that collects 
fiscal and non-fiscal data on all public schools, public school districts, and state education 
agencies in the United States.” NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., 2015–16 
SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY (SSOCS): RESTRICTED-USE DATA FILE USER’S 
MANUAL 8 (2017) [hereinafter CODEBOOK] (on file with author). For additional descriptions 
of the CCD see Nance, supra note 3, 959–60 (describing the CCD); Helen M. Marks & Jason 
P. Nance, Contexts of Accountability Under Systemic Reform: Implications for Principal 
Influence on Instruction and Supervision, 43 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 3, 10–11 (2007) (same). 
 131 The total number of public schools sampled was 3,553; of those, 2,092 schools 
submitted completed questionnaires for an overall response rate of 62.9% (weighted sample; 
58.9% (raw sample)). See CODEBOOK, supra note 130, at 1, 29; see also MICHAEL JACKSON, 
MELISSA DILIBERTI, JANA KEMP, STEVEN HUMMELL, CHRISTINA COX, KOMBA GBONDO-
TUGBAWA, DILLON SIMON & RACHEL HANSEN, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEPT. OF 
EDUC., 2015–16 SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY (SSOCS); PUBLIC-USE DATA FILE 
USER’S MANUAL 1 (2018), https://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2018107 
[https://perma.cc/DND6-2Y6Q]. 
 132 Among the 2,090 schools in the SSOCS data set, 1,890 (or 90.4%) were identified as 
a “regular public school” (as opposed to public charter or magnet schools) and serve as the 
focus of this study. This Article’s focus on “regular” public schools is consistent with parallel 
empirical work, particularly in the school finance literature. See IVY MORGAN & ARY 
AMERIKANER, THE EDUC. TRUST, FUNDING GAPS 2018: TECHNICAL APPENDIX 3 (2018). 
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that began in the 1999–2000 school year.133 Finally, to facilitate inferences 
to the broader universe of “regular” public schools, the approximately 1,890 
schools used in the analyses were weighted to generate population-level 
estimates.134 
Unlike past studies that use earlier versions of the SSOCS data set, our 
study supplements the SSOCS data set in two important ways that potentially 
inform the likelihood of a school reporting an incident to law enforcement 
agencies. First, we supplement the school-level SSOCS information with 
state-level information on what circumstances—and for what particular 
student offenses or incidents—do federal or state laws compel a school to 
report an incident to law enforcement agencies.135 Federal law, for example, 
mandates that all local education agencies (i.e., school districts) receiving 
federal education funding pursuant to the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (which includes virtually every “regular” public K-12 school) 
create and implement a policy “requiring referral to the criminal justice or 
juvenile delinquency system of any student who brings a firearm or weapon 
to a school . . . .”136 Such statutes eliminate (or severely reduce) schools’ 
discretion insofar as the statutes require them to report certain activities that 
occur on school property to law enforcement authorities regardless of 
surrounding or mitigating circumstances. At the same time, many state 
statutes go beyond federally imposed requirements and mandate that schools 
also refer to law enforcement agencies a range of student incidents and 
offenses that do not involve a firearm or weapon.137 
The second way we supplement the SSOCS data set involves the 
inclusion of school district-level data on current per pupil spending. We 
settled on current expenditures, partly as it facilitates comparisons of student 
investment across the widest array of studies in the school finance 
 
 133 Prior SSOCS data sets were collected in the 1999–2000, 2003–2004, 2005–2006, 
2007–2008 and 2009–2010 school years. CODEBOOK, supra note 130, at 1. While not publicly-
available during the execution of this study, the Department of Education recently made 
available the 2017–2018 version of the SSOCS data set. 
 134 Data in most of our analyses used the final analysis weight (“FINALWGT”) variable. 
Such sample weighting is necessary to “obtain population-based estimates, to minimize bias 
arising from differences between responding and nonresponding schools, and to calibrate the 
data to known population characteristics in a way that reduces sampling error.” CODEBOOK, 
supra note 130, at 20. 
 135 In this way our current study more helpfully aligns with Nance’s prior study of 2009–
2010 SSOCS data. See Nance, supra, note 3, at 934–36. 
 136 20 U.S.C. § 7151(h)(1); see also FLA. STAT. § 1006.07(l) (2014) (mandating that any 
student who brings a firearm or weapon to any school function will be expelled for a period 
not less than a year and “referred to the criminal justice or juvenile justice system”). 
 137 See supra Part I.A.1. 
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literature.138 To do so, we matched district-level spending data from the 2016 
U.S. Census Bureau’s publicly-available annual survey of public elementary 
and secondary schools onto the SSOCS data set.139 As well, the school 
district-level current per pupil spending data were adjusted for cost-of-living 
variation across the more than 13,000 public school districts with data from 
the Comparable Wage Index.140 
B. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
This Article’s main analytic focus dwells on the possible relation 
between the presence—as well as magnitude—of SRO/police at a school and 
that school’s rate of reporting student disciplinary incidents to law 
enforcement agencies. To this end, schools reported the total recorded 
number of student disciplinary incidents that took place at their school during 
the 2015–2016 school year as well as the subset of those incidents that 
resulted in school referrals to law enforcement agencies. The student 
discipline incident types that triggered school referrals to law enforcement 
agencies ranged from rapes and robberies with a weapon to the distribution, 
possession, or use of prescription drugs and alcohol as well as student 
“vandalism.”141 
The various student discipline incidents that prompted school reports to 
law enforcement agencies contributed to the creation of three separate 
dependent variables of interest. First, a dummy variable signals whether a 
school made at least one report to a law enforcement agency about a student 
incident at school during the 2015–2016 school year. Second, a continuous 
 
 138 See Michael Heise, Per Pupil Spending and Poverty’s Persistent Penalty: An 
Empirical Analysis of 2016 District-Level NCES Data, 45 J. EDUC. FIN. 149, 154–57 (2019) 
(comparing leading per pupil spending measures). 
 139 2016 Public Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/econ/school-finances/secondary-education-finance.
html [https://perma.cc/DMP5-V5WR] (last visited Mar. 5, 2021). 
 140 For a detailed description and explanation of the Comparable Wage Index see 
generally LORI L. TAYLOR & WILLIAM J. FOWLER, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR 
EDUC. STAT., A COMPARABLE WAGE APPROACH TO GEOGRAPHIC COST ADJUSTMENT (2006), 
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006321.pdf [https://perma.cc/AAK8-SX3D]. For a discussion 
of some of the limitations of the CWI adjustment, see Heise, supra note 138, at 154–55 n.20; 
Thomas A. DeLuca, Instructional Spending Metrics: A Multilevel Analysis Using NCES Data, 
44 J. EDUC. FIN. 23, 42 (2018). 
 141 The SSOCS data derive from school administrators’ reports on, for example, “recorded 
student incidents.” As such, while instructions describing how such variables were intended 
to be operationalized were included with the surveys to promote consistency across schools, 
to some unknown degree these data inevitably reflect school administrators’ interpretations of 
what constitutes a “student incident” warranting “recording.” See CODEBOOK, supra note 130, 
at 41. 
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variable captures a school’s rate (per 100 students) of student incident reports 
to law enforcement agencies. Finally, insofar as the types of incidents that 
schools reported to law enforcement include both violent (e.g., rape and 
armed robbery) as well as non-violent (e.g., vandalism and possession of 
alcohol) incidents, we felt that the subset of non-violent incidents warranted 
close inspection. This is especially true to the extent that some schools may 
have been systematically less inclined to report non-violent student incidents 
to law enforcement agencies. To this end we constructed a third dependent 
variable designed to capture a school’s rate (per 100 students) of student 
incident reports to law enforcement agencies for the subset of non-violent 
student incidents. Our decision to transform raw school report counts into 
school report rates (per 100 students) seeks to account for variation in school 
size or scale (expressed in terms of student enrollment) across the sampled 
schools.142 
A descriptive summary of our dependent variables, presented in Table 
1, illustrates that almost one-half (49%) of the schools in our weighted 
sample reported at least one student incident to law enforcement agencies 
during the 2015–2016 school year. The mean rate of school reports to law 
enforcement agencies is just under one (0.77) per 100 students.143 The mean 
rate of school reports involving non-violent student incidents is well under 
one-half (0.33) per 100 students.144 
C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Insofar as our analytical focus dwells on the possible relation between 
a school’s rate of reporting student incidents to law enforcement agencies 
and the presence—and magnitude—of law enforcement officials at the 
school, our key independent variables of interest relate to a school’s 
SRO/police presence. Specifically, we focus not only on whether a school 
 
 142 Unreported alternative specifications exploring schools’ rates of student disciplinary 
incident reports to police use the square root of the rate as its distribution is less distorted by 
schools that reported no such incidents. Results from these unreported analyses do not 
materially differ from our results that derive from non-transformed rates. See infra tbl.4. 
 143 As the mean student enrollment in our school sample is just under 600 students (595.4), 
on average each school reported just over four (4.6) student incidents. Because only 49% of 
schools reported any incidents, the effective mean number of incident reports to law 
enforcement is approximately nine student incidents among those schools that reported any 
incidents. 
 144 Similarly, as the mean student enrollment in our school sample is just under 600 
students (595.4), on average each school reported just under two (1.98) non-violent incidents. 
Because only 49% of schools reported any incidents, violent or non-violent, the effective mean 
number of non-violent incident reports to law enforcement is approximately four non-violent 
incidents among those schools that reported any incidents. 
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has any full- or part-time SRO or sworn police officers present at least once 
a week at their school but also how many. 
Based on reports from school administrators we assessed this by 
constructing two related but independent variables. One is a dummy variable 
that signals those schools who reported the presence of either a full- or part-
time SRO/police officer at their school at least once a week. Including this 
dummy variable facilitates comparisons with prior scholarship using earlier 
SSOCS data sets.145 As Table 1 illustrates, 50% of the regular schools in our 
weighted sample reported at least one full- or part-time SRO/police officer 
on site at least once a week during the 2015–2016 school year. 
Many prior studies compare schools who reported the presence of either 
a full- or part-time SRO/police officer present at the school at least once a 
week with those schools that lack any SRO/police presence. Such studies, 
while helpful, ignore how variation in the magnitude of a school’s 
SRO/police presence across schools may itself inform the likelihood of a 
school referring student incidents to law enforcement. That is, a greater 
number of SRO/police at a school may itself exert upward influence on the 
number of school reports to law enforcement agencies. To better explore this 
possibility, we created a second independent variable assessing the total 
number of SRO or sworn police officers at a school. Interestingly, as Table 
1 illustrates, one-half of the sampled schools report any law enforcement 
presence; the mean SRO/police presence is just under one (0.84) official per 
school.146 
In addition to its SRO/police presence, if any, a school’s likelihood of 
reporting student incidents to law enforcement agencies is certainly also the 
function of a complex interaction of other variables. The inclusion of such 
variables is necessary to help control for various factors’ influence on 
schools’ student incident reports to law enforcement agencies that are 
independent of factors located at the focal point of this study—the presence 
of SRO/police at a school. The various control variables we consider loosely 
organize into two general categories: school- and student-level factors. 
 
 145 For a similar approach toward this key independent variable, see, e.g., Nance, supra 
note 3, at 961–62 n.216. The SRO/police calculation excludes any security guards or other 
individuals contributing to school safety who are not sworn law enforcement officers. See 
supra note 129. 
 146 Insofar as only one-half of the schools in our sample report any SRO/law enforcement 
officials present at least once a week, the effective number of law enforcement officials at 
schools that report any is approximately 1.6 per school. 
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D. CONTROL VARIABLES 
1. School-Level Variables 
Insofar as we seek to estimate models assessing the likelihood of a 
school reporting student incidents to law enforcement agencies, such factors 
as a school’s base “disorder” level and student enrollment “turbulence” 
within a school, a school’s urbanicity score, and an assessment of the general 
crime level where the school is located are important as they likely inform 
the school’s reporting rates. To measure a school’s base “disorder” level we 
constructed a school disorder variable by indexing a school’s total number of 
recorded student disciplinary incidents (per 100 students).147 A school’s 
student enrollment turbulence measure is the percentage of the school’s 
students who either transferred into or out of the school during the 2015–
2016 school year. As well, school “urbaniticity,” based on the school’s 
geographic location, is measured on a four-point scale, ranging from “rural” 
to “urban.” Finally, a three-point scale assessing a school’s general crime 
level measure derives from school administrators’ perceptions of general 
crime levels in the geographic area in which their school is located. 
While many key variables already account for variation in student 
enrollment across schools, we include a school’s raw student enrollment as a 
separate independent variable to help capture whether a school’s scale exerts 
any influence on its student discipline reporting behaviors. For similar—
though distinct—reasons, we also include a variable measuring each school’s 
student-to-teacher ratio. To the extent that smaller schools or schools 
benefitting from a higher percentage of adults, specifically, teachers, are 
more likely to facilitate the emergence of a comparatively healthier school 
“climate” or “culture,” we hypothesize that school reporting to law 
enforcement agencies is more likely in larger and potentially more 
impersonal schools. 
Along with student enrollment, student-to-teacher ratios, school 
disruption, and enrollment turbulence, another factor plausibly contributing 
to a school’s overall climate and culture involves a school’s fiscal strength. 
For this we turn to a standard proxy, annual (2015–2016) current per pupil 
spending. We do so because we wonder whether variation in the distribution 
of student investment across schools might contribute to variation in schools’ 
rate of reporting student incidents to law enforcement authorities. And even 
 
 147 A school’s total “recorded” student disciplinary incidents forms the universe from 
which the subset of student disciplinary incidents that the school “reported” to law 
enforcement agencies derives. That is, while every school report to law enforcement agencies 
involved, by definition, a recorded student disciplinary incident, not every recorded student 
disciplinary incident culminated in a school report to a law enforcement agency. 
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if such a relation or its direction are not obvious, school fiscal data may 
capture other unobservable aspects of a school or its culture that warrant 
controlling for. 
To do so, and to extend existing research, we exploit the leading source 
of school district-level per pupil spending data: U.S. Census Bureau’s annual 
survey of public elementary and secondary schools for financial 
information148 supplemented by the U.S. Department of Education’s 
National Center for Education Statistics Comparable Wage Index. The 
supplemental data adjust for cost-of-living variation across the nations more 
than 13,000 public school districts.149 We settled on current expenditures 
partly because it facilitates comparisons of student investment across the 
widest array of studies in the school finance literature.150 As Table 1 makes 
clear, across all the schools in our sample, mean current per pupil spending 
exceeded $11,000 for the sampled schools in 2015–2016. 
Slightly complicating our decision to include per pupil spending data is 
that our data include school district-level means. The total (raw) number of 
schools in our sample (1,890) derives from 1,490 different school districts. 
Thus, 400 schools in our sample come from a district that includes at least 
one or more other schools in the sample. For those schools that share a school 
district, their district-level current per pupil spending value does not vary. 
While admittedly not ideal, to the extent that attention to per pupil spending 
discrepancies typically focuses on variation across—rather than within—
school districts, the district-level per pupil spending data should not unduly 
distort our results.151 Finally, what little empirical evidence exists suggests 
that, when it comes to within district school spending variations, in many 
instances schools serving higher concentrations of minority students or 
students from low-income households can receive more in terms of per pupil 
spending than schools serving a smaller percentage of minority students or 
those from low-income households or both.152 
 
 148 See 2016 Public Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data, supra note 139. 
 149 For a detailed description and explanation of the Comparable Wage Index see 
generally TAYLOR & FOWLER, supra note 140. For a discussion of some of the limitations of 
the CWI adjustment see DeLuca, supra note 140, at 42. 
 150 For a discussion of the various leading per pupil spending measures, see Heise, supra 
note 138, at 154–57 (comparing leading per pupil spending measures). 
 151 But see Ary Amerikaner, The Hidden Inequality in Schools, N.Y. TIMES, January 30, 
2020, at A31 (noting that in some school districts consequential per pupil spending variation 
exists across schools). 
 152 See generally Simon Ejdemyr and Kenneth A. Shores, Pulling Back the Curtain: Intra-
District School Spending Inequality and its Correlates, (July 31, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3009775 [https://perma.cc/
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Insofar as mandatory school reporting obligations for various student 
incidents bear, by design, squarely on our dependent variables of interest, our 
models also control for whether schools were statutorily obligated to report 
various incident types to law enforcement agencies under prevailing state 
law.153 To accomplish this we drew from the relevant statutes and regulations 
in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Where a clear and relatively 
unambiguous mandatory reporting obligation existed, our dummy variable is 
coded as “1.” To focus our analyses of the sub-pool of non-violent student 
discipline incidents we include two separate mandatory reporting variables: 
one for violent student incidents; the other for non-violent incidents. 
Finally, even though the majority of public schools in the United States 
are elementary schools and, as Table 1 illustrates, our sample reflects this 
(59% of the sampled schools are elementary schools), most school crime and 
violence occurs in middle and high schools. Despite the skewed distribution 
of school crime and violence across school levels, we remain mindful that 
the Sandy Hook (CT) Elementary School tragedy in December 2012 
unfolded only a few years prior to the data gathering efforts that culminated 
in the 2015–2016 SSOCS data set. Consequently, we approached this study 
with a heightened curiosity about how elementary schools might 
systematically differ from middle and high schools in terms of their proclivity 
to report student disciplinary incidents to law enforcement agencies. To 
explore this, we include in our models a dummy variable coded for “1” for 
elementary schools.154 Insofar as the reference group for interpreting the 
elementary school dummy variable includes all “non-elementary” schools,155 
what we expect to find is that elementary schools report systematically fewer 
school incidents reports to law enforcement and a comparatively smaller 
SRO/police presence. Despite our own “priors” about elementary schools, 
violence, and school reporting, what we found is a larger number of student 
incidents as well as more SRO/police assigned to elementary schools than 
we initially expected.156 Finally, as school-to-prison pipeline hypotheses 
 
R4ZT-WHQB] (observing that schools serving higher need students often noted for 
comparatively greater per pupil spending levels). 
 153 Our focus on state-specific mandatory reporting statutes implicitly acknowledges that 
application of relevant federal reporting requirements, by definition, should not have varied 
across the schools in our sample. State-level mandatory reporting requirements, by contrast, 
did vary. 
 154 For purposes of this study, a school facility was coded as an “elementary” school if the 
highest grade level present in the school facility was at (or below) the eighth grade or lower 
and if the lowest grade level present was at (or below) the third grade. 
 155 And this reference group includes all middle and high schools, as well as schools that 
combine middle and high school grades. 
 156 See infra tbl.6. 
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likely cut in anomalous and unexpected ways in the elementary school 
context, we focus on the elementary school context in supplemental 
analyses.157 
2. Student-Focused Variables 
In addition to the variables summarized above, key student-focused 
factors, especially those factors reflecting possible student marginalization, 
likely influence a school’s rate of student incident reporting to law 
enforcement agencies.158 Factors aligning with various student 
marginalization theses and inserted into in our models include a school’s 
percentage of all nonwhite (including Black) and Black students as well as 
the percentage of students from low-income households.159 Moreover, as 
boys are more likely than girls to trigger school discipline matters, we also 
control for a school’s percentage of male students.160 Table 1 presents basic 
summary statistics on all the variables considered in our various models. 
  
 
 157 See infra Part III.C. 
 158 See, e.g., DAVID CANTOR & MAREENA MCKINLEY WRIGHT, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
SCHOOL CRIME PATTERNS: A NATIONAL PROFILE OF U.S. PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS USING RATES 
OF CRIME REPORTED TO POLICE 8 (2002), https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OUS/PES/studies-
school-violence/school-crime-pattern.pdf [https://perma.cc/92YW-GGWQ] (finding that 
large high schools located in urban areas serving a high percentage of minority students tend 
to experience more school crime); TRAVIS III & COON, supra note 95, at 20 (observing that 
crime is more common in schools that serve students from disadvantaged backgrounds). See 
generally Aaron Kupchik & Geoff K. Ward, Race, Poverty, and Exclusionary School Security: 
An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Elementary, Middle, and High Schools, 12 YOUTH VIOLENCE 
& JUV. JUST. 332 (2014) (finding that exclusionary student security measures are more 
common in comparatively more non-white schools). 
 159 The students from low-income household variable is construed to include those 
students eligible to participate in a free- or reduced-lunch program. For a general discussion 
of various student poverty measures, see Heise, supra note 138, at 158. 
 160 For example, compare Skiba, Michael, Nardo & Peterson, supra note 19, at 320 (“In 
virtually every study presenting school disciplinary data by gender, boys are referred to the 
office and receive a range of disciplinary consequences at a significantly higher rate than 
girls.”) and Wallace Jr., Goodkind, Wallace & Bachman, supra note 19, at 54 (“Within racial 
and ethnic subgroups, boys are consistently more likely than girls of the same racial or ethnic 
group to have experienced school discipline.”), with Nance, supra note 3, at 972–73 (reporting 
“mixed” results as it relates to the influence of various student background characteristics of 
school incident reports to law enforcement). 
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Table 1: Summary Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Dep. vars:   
School reported one or more incident to police (1=yes) 0.49 0.50 
Rate of school police reports (per 100 students) [all] 0.77 1.92 
Rate of school police reports (per 100 students) [non-violent] 0.33 0.79 
Ind. vars:   
Was a full- or part-time SRO/police at school (1=yes) 0.50 0.50 
Number of full- and part-time SRO/police at school 0.84 2.44 
School student:teacher ratio 17.79 23.58 
School student mobility % (in/out) 15.05 14.02 
School urbanicity scale (rural-to-urban; 1-4) 2.51 1.14 
School disorder report rate (per 100 students) 1.57 3.10 
School area crime scale (low-to-high; 1-3) 1.31 0.58 
School student enrollment 595.4 413.9 
Elementary school (1=yes) 0.59 0.49 
Mand. school violent incident report req. (1=yes) 0.90 0.30 
Mand. school non-violent incident report req. (1=yes) 0.69 0.46 
School student poverty % 56.15 27.29 
School student nonwhite % 43.1 32.92 
School student Black % 12.46 20.91 
School student male % 49.7 9.1 
School district mean per pupil spending (2016 $s) 11,196 5,153 
NOTES: Reported means and standard deviations derive from the SSOCS weighted 
sample; N (raw)=1,890. 
SOURCES: U. S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics, 2015–2016 School Survey 
on Crime and Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bureau, 2016 Public 
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance File (2016). 
E. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
We test our various research hypotheses with three different, though 
related, empirical specifications. One general question (and one pursued in 
prior research161) involves whether the presence of any SRO/police at a 
school influences the likelihood of that school referring student discipline 
incidents to law enforcement agencies. To explore this question, we estimate 
logistic regression models of whether a school referred any student incidents 
to law enforcement agencies and include a dummy variable signaling 
whether the school had any SRO/police present at school at least one day per 
week. 
A separate—though related—research question considers whether the 
magnitude of a school’s SRO/police presence influences a school’s 
 
 161 See, e.g., Nance, supra note 3, at 969 tbl.2 (analyzing 2009–2010 SSOCS data). 
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propensity to report student discipline incidents to law enforcement agencies. 
Our approach to this question exploits potentially systematic variation 
supplied by more granular information included in our key variables of 
interest—the rate of a school’s reports to law enforcement agencies and the 
number of SRO/police officials present at each school. To do so, we estimate 
fractional response regression models of a continuous variable—the rate of 
school incident reports to law enforcement—bounded between zero and 
one.162 
Finally, we pursue a third question with a selection strategy. The sub-
pool of student disciplinary incidents that triggered school referrals to law 
enforcement agencies derives from the broader universe of total student 
disciplinary incidents “recorded” at a school.163 One key across-school 
variation of interest involves whether, for any given student disciplinary 
incident recorded at a school, a school referral to a law enforcement agency 
ensued. Approximately 20% of the schools in our sample, however, did not 
experience any recorded student disciplinary incidents and, by definition, had 
nothing to consider in terms of reporting to law enforcement agencies. 
Moreover, our instinct is that the distribution of total student disciplinary 
incidents across schools is unlikely random and our data permit us to 
structure a two-stage inquiry that exploits this distribution. To pursue this, 
we estimate a two-stage Heckman selection model. In stage one we model 
whether a school experienced a student disciplinary “incident” (one or more); 
stage two then models the rate of a school’s reports (or non-reports) to law 
enforcement agencies, conditioned on the school having experienced at least 
one incident. 
F. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY LIMITATIONS 
Despite the SSOCS data set’s obvious merits, it is not without 
limitations. For example, while data exist on a variety of school- and student-
level measures, including a school’s gender and racial/ethnic profiles, the 
data set does not include gender or racial information on the actual students 
 
 162 Insofar as our dependent variable is a rate (or fraction) bounded between zero and one 
(inclusive), we preferenced fractional response regression models. Owing to the possibility of 
overdispersion, and in an abundance of caution, we also considered two alternative 
specifications in an effort to ensure that our core results were robust to model specification. 
Unreported results from a binominal regression model as well as a negative binominal 
regression model using actual raw school-level count data do not materially differ from results 
presented in tbl.2, infra. For examples of a similar empirical strategy, see, e.g., Daniel Hamlin 
& Angran Li, The Relationship Between Parent Volunteering in School and School Safety in 
Disadvantaged Urban Neighborhoods, 19 J. SCH. VIOLENCE 362, 367 (2020) (presenting 
results from negative binominal regression models). 
 163 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
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involved in the disciplinary incidents that triggered school reports to law 
enforcement agencies. The absence of such information, of course, 
functionally precludes precise inferences about whether schools’ student 
incident reporting practices distributed in ways that skew at the individual-
level against, for example, boys, racial/ethnic minorities, or students from 
low-income households. 
Similarly, given the absence of particularized and follow-up data on 
those students who engaged in incidents that motivated school reports to law 
enforcement agencies, we cannot know what actually happened to those 
students reported. As difficult as it might be to imagine that all such students 
were arrested and convicted, it is equally difficult to imagine that none of 
them were. Moreover, the SSOCS data set similarly precludes analyses of 
how the array of possible outcomes—arrest, conviction, or release without 
arrest—distributed across those students referred to law enforcement 
agencies by their schools. 
Of course, the absence of more particularized data on the law 
enforcement agency referrals’ outcomes, however, does little to deflect from 
the larger point that any student referral to a law enforcement agency is 
plausibly important and, to some extent, likely changes that student’s future 
for the worse. Regardless of any formal legal consequences, a school’s 
referral to law enforcement can also culminate with student discipline, 
suspensions, or expulsions in the school context.164 
In terms of our overall empirical strategy, we remain mindful that 
research design limitations preclude our findings from supporting any strong 
causal claims. In a more perfect world, we would (for example) randomly 
assign SRO/police to otherwise identical schools (as it relates to our various 
dependent variables of interest) to assess possible causal relations between a 
school’s rate of reporting student discipline incidents to law enforcement 
agencies and the magnitude of law enforcement officials at the schools. Our 
lack of control over randomization precludes us from assessing casual 
direction with precision. For example, the number of SRO/police at a school 
may be a product of pre-existing student disruption, crime levels, or student 
disciplinary incidents. Similarly, it is also plausible that the presence of 
SRO/police at the school itself may inform a school’s rate of incident 
reporting to law enforcement agencies. 
As a “second best” empirical strategy, we are limited to exploiting a rich 
array of control variables designed to help disentangle the complex relations 
 
 164 See Hawker v. Sandy City Corp., 774 F.3d 1243, 1245–46 (10th Cir. 2014) (observing 
how schools’ student disciplinary referrals to law enforcement contribute to a “school-to-
prison pipeline”). 
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between and among our dependent and key independent variables of interest. 
For example, as it specifically relates to our hypotheses on a relation between 
SRO/police at a school and that school’s student incident reporting to law 
enforcement agencies, our models seek to control for other likely factors that 
bear on a school’s likelihood of reporting incidents to law enforcement. 
While these important data and research design factors preclude strong causal 
claims, we feel that our results are positioned to contribute to the existing 
knowledge base on school crime and safety.165 
As Table 1 reveals that one-half of the sampled schools did not have 
any SRO/police presence, Table 2 provides a glimpse into how schools with 
an SRO/police presence (one or more) compare with schools that did not 
have any. In general, schools with an SRO/police presence reported slightly 
high school disorder rates, larger student enrollments, and spent a bit less per 
pupil than schools without an SRO/police presence. Table 2 also makes clear 
that an SRO/police presence was less common in elementary schools. 
  
 
 165 As well, the data and empirical strategy factors that limit the force of the claims in this 
study are similar to limitations that attach to prior studies on this topic. See, e.g., Nance, supra 
note 3, at 971. 
2021] "DEFUND THE (SCHOOL) POLICE"? 755 
Table 2: Comparing School Means With and Without Any SRO/Police 
Presence 
  
 With Without 
Ind. vars:   
School student:teacher ratio 17.14 18.44 
School student mobility % (in/out) 15.62 14.48 
School urbanicity scale (rural-to-urban; 1-4) 2.53 2.49 
School disorder report rate (per 100 students) 1.91 1.23 
School area crime scale (low-to-high; 1-3) 1.31 1.31 
School student enrollment 714.52 476.29 
Elementary school (1=yes) 0.45 0.74 
Mandatory school violent incident report req. (1=yes) 0.88 0.92 
Mandatory school non-violent incident report req. (1=yes) 0.66 0.71 
School student poverty % 55.65 56.65 
School student nonwhite % 42.81 43.38 
School student Black % 13.35 11.56 
School student male % 49.54 49.86 
School district mean per pupil spending (2016 $s) 10,885 11,509 
N (raw) 1,270 620 
NOTES: Reported means derive from the SSOCS weighted sample. 
SOURCES: U. S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics, 2015–2016 School Survey 
on Crime and Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bureau, 2016 Public 
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance File (2016). 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Our initial logistic regression models more closely hew to prior 
scholarship, and results from these models facilitate comparisons to earlier 
studies. In alternative, though complementary, analyses we estimate 
fractional regression models appropriate for a more granular dependent 
variable expressed as a school’s rate of reporting student discipline incidents 
to law enforcement agencies. An additional set of analyses considers—and 
endeavors to adjust for—the possible influence of selection effects. Finally, 
insofar as elementary schools may behave systematically differently in the 
student discipline context, we repeat our core analyses on elementary 
schools. 
A. LOGISTIC AND FRACTIONAL REGRESSION MODELS 
We begin our analyses at a general level to facilitate comparisons with 
prior scholarly work using earlier SSOCS data sets. Specifically, we initially 
consider whether any SRO/police presence (no matter how large or small) at 
a school influences the likelihood of that school referring student disciplinary 
incidents to law enforcement agencies. To assess this question, we estimate 
logistic models of whether a school referred any student incidents to law 
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enforcement agencies and include a dummy variable signaling whether a 
school had any SRO/police presence. 
Results presented in Table 3 provide some level of clarity as well as 
introduce a potentially informative—if complicating—wrinkle. As our naïve 
model (Model 1) makes clear, any SRO/police presence at a school 
corresponds with an increased likelihood of that school reporting one (or 
more) student incidents to law enforcement agencies. While the addition of 
our suite of control variables into the right-hand side of our equation (Model 
2) dampens the statistical influence attributable to a school’s SRO/police 
presence, this variable nonetheless persists as statistically important. At the 
same time, other control variables also emerge as important and most do so 
in the expected directions. In particular, schools that are comparatively 
larger, more urban, and that report higher student “disorder” rates 
systematically increase the odds of the school referring student incidents to 
law enforcement agencies. Elementary schools, by contrast, were 
comparatively less likely to report.166 
Model 3 explores an analogous—though distinct—question. Where 
models 1 and 2 explore the influence of any SRO/police presence on a 
school’s likelihood of reporting student incidents to law enforcement 
agencies, model 3 considers whether variation in the size of a school’s 
SRO/police presence matters. And the (null) result in model 3 implies—in 
conjunction with results from models 1 and 2—that when it comes to 
increasing the likelihood of a school referring one or more student incidents 
to law enforcement agencies, what matters was whether a school had an 
SRO/police presence rather than the size of that presence. Moreover, results 
in models 2 and 3 are notable for key control variables’ robustness, 
specifically variables relating to schools’ size and student disorder rates. 
Finally, our findings in Table 3 generally comport with prior scholarship that 
analyzes earlier SSOCS data sets.167 
Results in Table 3 also introduce a second general theme that persists 
across our analyses: an overall paucity of statistically significant findings for 
an array of school-level variables plausibly germane to distributional 
concerns deriving from schools’ engagement with law enforcement agencies. 
It remains important to keep in mind that data limitations preclude analyses 
of how schools’ law enforcement referral practices distribute across various 
 
 166 As elementary schools may be somewhat anomalous for an array of reasons, we 
explore them further in separate analyses. See infra Part III.C. 
 167 See, e.g., Nance, supra note 3, at 969 (reporting similar overall findings analyzing 
2009–2010 SSOCS data). 
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individual-level student sub-groups, particularly the comparatively more 
vulnerable student sub-groups.168 
Our findings do shed light—if incomplete—on how law enforcement 
agency referrals distribute across schools with various student sub-group 
compositions. Notably, as Table 3 illustrates, a school’s percentage of 
students in poverty, Black students, nonwhite students, and male students do 
not correspond with any systematic increase in that school’s likelihood of 
reporting student incidents to law enforcement agencies. Similarly, variation 
in district-level mean per pupil spending does not achieve statistical 
significance. While we are mindful that null results are quite limited in what 
they can appropriately bear analytically, in this context, the absence of 
statistical evidence of problematic school-level distributional factors caught 
our attention. Enhancing our surprise with these null findings is their 
juxtaposition with the often strong and persistent distributional concerns 
found in the existing literature.169 
Finally, and somewhat surprisingly, we note the uneven results for the 
state-level mandatory reporting requirement variables in Table 3. What the 
results imply is that the presence of mandatory reporting requirements for 
non-violent student incidents corresponds with a reduction in the odds that a 
school reported a student disciplinary incident to a law enforcement agency. 
At the risk of trying to explain the inexplicable, we note that both state 
mandatory reporting requirement variables do not vary all that much across 
the states. In addition, along with various state and federal reporting 
requirements, many schools and their districts have their own policies, 
practices, or norms relating to student disciplinary referrals.170 These risk 
 
 168 The SSOCS data set does not include individualize information of the actual students 
whose conduct triggered a law enforcement referral. 
 169 See, e.g., Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 623; Torres & Stefkovich, supra note 3, 
at 463. Our results generally comport with F. Chris Curran and his colleagues’ findings from 
observing the effects of SRO programs on students, including the frequency of student arrests, 
in two mid-sized suburban school districts in the South. See supra notes 69–73 and 
accompanying text (“SROs tended to view the risk of threats and their approaches to school 
discipline similarly, regardless of the racial composition of the school.”). However, an 
importance difference between our study and their study is that we examined schools’ 
likelihood of reporting student incidents to law enforcement agencies, whereas they examined 
SROs’ approach to student discipline, including student arrests. See CURRAN, FISHER, VIANO 
& KUPCHIK, supra note 69, at 31–32. Our results also somewhat parallel results from a small 
handful of empirical studies of exclusionary school discipline. Specifically, some studies show 
that Black students are not subject to exclusionary discipline at higher rates for more serious 
and objectively defined offenses, especially when discipline is mandated. See supra notes 58–
59 and accompanying text; see also Heise & Nance, supra note 18, at 24–28. 
 170 See, e.g., CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHS., STUDENTS RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 2019-20, at 
11 (2019); HOUS. INDEP. SCH. DIST., 2019-2020 CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT 12, 13, 16 (2019). 
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injecting some level of imprecision into our mandatory reporting requirement 
variables. 
 
Table 3: Logistic Regression Models of Whether a School Reported a 
Student Discipline Incident to a Law Enforcement Agency 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Full- or pt.-time SRO/police (1=yes) 2.85** (0.37) 1.51* (0.25) ---  
Num. of full- and pt.-time  
  SRO/police at school 
  ---  1.06 (0.05) 
School student:teacher ratio   1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
School student mobility % (in/out)   1.00 (0.01) 1.00 (0.01) 
School urban. scale (rural-to-urban)   1.18* (0.10) 1.18 (0.10) 
School disorder report rate (per 100)   1.26** (0.09) 1.26** (0.09) 
School area crime scale (lo-to-hi)   1.37 (0.26) 1.35 (0.25) 
School student enrollment   1.00** (0.00) 1.00** (0.00) 
Elementary school (1=yes)   0.17** (0.03) 0.16** (0.03) 
Violent incident report req. (1=yes)   0.78 (0.22) 0.74 (0.21) 
Non-violent incident report req. (1=yes)   0.68* (0.13) 0.69* (0.13) 
School poverty %   1.01 (0.00) 1.01 (0.00) 
School nonwhite %   1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
School Black %   0.99 (0.01) 0.99 (0.01) 
School male %   0.98 (0.01) 0.98 (0.01) 
School district mean per pupil spending   1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
       
Constant 0.56** (0.05) 1.12 (0.72) 1.14 (0.89) 
Pseudo R2 0.05  0.27  0.27  
N (raw) 1,890  1,890  1,890  
NOTES: Whether a school reported a student disciplinary incident to law 
enforcement agencies (1=yes). Robust standard errors, clustered on school district, 
in parentheses. The models were estimated using the “logistic” command in Stata 
(v.16.1) and used SSOCS weighted data. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
SOURCES: U.S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics, 2015–2016 School Survey 
on Crime and Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bureau, 2016 Public 
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance File (2016). 
 
While results from our logistic regression specifications (reported in 
Table 3) are necessary to help tether our study to prior leading scholarship 
using earlier SSOCS data sets, such specifications do not fully exploit helpful 
additional variation contained in the data set. To explore further, we 
considered how variation in the number of SRO/police officials present at 
each school informed the school’s rate of reporting student discipline 
incidents to law enforcement agencies. To do so, we estimate fractional 
response regression models (Table 4) of a continuous rate (or fractional) 
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variable—specifically, the rate of school incident reports to law enforcement 
agencies. In this way we can better assess whether variation in a school’s 
SRO/police presence size corresponds with variation in school reporting 
rates. 
Comparing results presented in Tables 3 and 4 reveals how key findings 
generally persist across different models and empirical approaches as well as 
comport with the weight of existing empirical research. Specifically, an 
increase in the size of a school’s SRO/police presence consistently and 
strongly correlates with an increase in a school’s rate of law enforcement 
agency referrals. And this result emerges for all student disciplinary incidents 
(model 1) as well as for the subset of non-violent incidents (model 2). While 
we introduce separate analyses for non-violent student incidents on the 
theory that schools may be more comfortable with handling such incidents 
“in-house” and perhaps have a history of doing so, when it comes to law 
enforcement reporting results, Table 4 suggests that schools appear to have 
treated violent and non-violent student discipline incidents similarly. 
Also similar to Table 3 is that none of the results in Table 4, with one 
exception, provide support for distributional concerns. The one exception is 
that an increase in a school’s percentage of students in poverty corresponds 
with an increased rate of reports to law enforcement agencies for non-violent 
student incidents (model 2). 
The influences of a school’s disorder rate, student enrollment, and 
enrollment stability (or student mobility) also persisted across our different 
empirical approaches. Another enduring influence is that elementary schools 
correspond with a reduced likelihood of school reporting to law enforcement 
agencies. In all but one instance the mandatory reporting requirement 
variables do not emerge as significant influences on schools’ reporting 
behavior. Moreover, in the one instance (model 2) where state reporting 
requirements for non-violent student conduct achieves statistical 
significance, it corresponds with a decreased likelihood of school reports of 
non-violent student incidents, thereby contributing further confusion about 
the influence of mandatory reporting requirements. 
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Table 4: Fractional Response Regression Models of School Report Rates for 








Ttl. SRO/police at school 1.03** (0.01) 1.02** (0.01) 
School student:teacher ratio 0.99 (0.01) 1.00 (0.00) 
School student mobility % (in/out) 1.02* (0.01) 1.01* (0.00) 
School urban. scale (rural-to-urban) 0.93 (0.07) 0.97 (0.05) 
School disorder report rate 1.06** (0.02) 1.03** (0.01) 
School area crime scale (lo-to-hi) 1.07 (0.12) 1.21* (0.11) 
School student enrollment 1.00** (0.00) 1.00** (0.00) 
Elementary school (1=yes) 0.29** (0.08) 0.11** (0.02) 
Vio. incident report req. (1=yes) 0.59 (0.19) 1.04 (0.17) 
Non-vio incident report req. (1=yes) 0.85 (0.11) 0.70** (0.08) 
School poverty % 1.00 (0.00) 1.00* (0.00) 
School nonwhite % 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
School Black % 1.00 (0.00) 0.99 (0.00) 
School male % 0.98 (0.01) 1.00 (0.01) 
School district mean per pupil spending 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
     
Constant 0.04 (0.03) 0.00** (0.00) 
Pseudo R2 0.08  0.09  
N (raw) 1,890  1,890  
NOTES: The dependent variables include the rate of school reports for all student 
disciplinary incidents to law enforcement agencies and the rate of school reports for 
only non-violent student incidents to law enforcement agencies. Robust standard 
errors, clustered on school district, in parentheses. The models were estimated using 
the “fracreg logit” command in Stata (v.16.1) and used the odds ratio option and 
SSOCS weighted data. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
SOURCES: U.S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics, 2015–2016 School Survey 
on Crime and Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bureau, 2016 Public 
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance File (2016). 
B. THE SPECTER OF SCHOOL SELECTIONS 
A school’s referral of a student disciplinary incident to a law 
enforcement agency requires, by definition, the existence of a recorded 
student “incident.” Approximately 20% of the schools in our weighted 
sample, however, did not experience any recorded student “incidents” during 
the 2015-16 school year and, thus, did not even have to consider whether any 
particular student discipline incident rose to the level of warranting a report 
to a law enforcement agency. What this means is that the 51.5% of schools 
that reported no incidents to law enforcement agencies includes a 
consequential number of schools (20.2%) that did not experience any 
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recorded student disciplinary incidents. While both sets of schools report a 
referral rate of zero (0.0) in our data set, such a referral rate from schools that 
experienced no recorded student disciplinary incidents meaningfully differs 
from the same reported rate (zero) from schools that experienced recorded 
student incidents and yet, for whatever reason or reasons, affirmatively 
declined to refer any of the recorded student discipline incidents to law 
enforcement agencies. 
In addition, our collective instinct is that the 20.2% of the schools in our 
sample that did not experience any recorded student disciplinary incidents 
likely systematically varies from schools that did. Consequently, such factors 
introduce the potential influence of selection bias. To explore this possibility, 
we turned to a two-stage Heckman model to better account for possible 
selection effects. In stage one we model whether a school experienced any 
recorded student disciplinary incident (one or more); stage two then models 
a school’s rate of reports to law enforcement agencies, conditioned on the 
school having experienced at least one recorded student discipline incident. 
When conditioned on having experienced at least one recorded student 
disciplinary incident, results from the top panel in Table 5 (the second-stage) 
generally comport with prior results (Tales 3 and 4) for our key variables of 
interest. When it comes to predicting variation in schools’ rates of law 
enforcement agency referrals, what persists as important include the size of 
a school’s SRO/police presence, its student disorder rate, and whether it is an 
elementary school. Also consistent with our prior findings is that results in 
Table 5 do not contribute to any distributional concerns. 
Results in Table 5 also introduce a few new additional wrinkles. For 
example, emerging as statistically important for the first time in Table 5 is 
that a reduction in a school’s student:teacher ratio corresponds with an 
increase in the school’s law enforcement agency referral rate. In addition, 
and parallel to the student:teacher ratio finding, a focus only on non-violent 
incidents (model 2) reveals that an increase in student enrollment correlates 
with an increase in the rate of school referrals. Finally, similar to what we 
find in Table 4, results in Table 5 illustrate that only non-violent student 
incident mandatory reporting requirements achieve statistical significance 
and correspond with a decrease in school referrals to law enforcement 
agencies. 
Our initial instinct that the subset of schools that experienced no 
recorded student disciplinary incidents systematically differs from the much 
larger subset of schools that experienced at least one student recorded 
discipline incident—and that this filtering may distort models of schools’ law 
enforcement agency reporting tendencies—does not find support in our 
results, as the Rho test statistics do not achieve statistical significance. While 
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a two-stage specification may not be necessarily required by our data set’s 
underlying structure we remain, as of yet anyway, unprepared to entirely 
dismiss the possible influence of selection effects, particularly as the Rho test 
statistic is notoriously sensitive to model specification.171 If nothing else, 
results in Table 5 provide yet another robustness check for our core results 
and selection model specifications offer an alternative approach to our data 
set’s underlying structure.  
Overall, when it comes to either whether schools report student 
disciplinary incidents to law enforcement agencies and, if they do, at what 
rate, we find consistent evidence—and across virtually all of our models—
on two general points. First, a school’s SRO/police presence exerts upward 
influence on the school’s inclination to report student incidents to law 
enforcement agencies. This finding persists even when we focus on non-
violent student disciplinary incidents. In addition to the importance of a 
school’s SRO/police presence, other factors that also emerged as consistently 
influential include a school’s disorder rate, enrollment factors, and whether 
a school is an elementary school. 
A second key finding involves what we do not find. While student-level 
distributional concerns certainly remain a possibility (though outside of our 
data set’s scope), our school-level findings, however, do not hint at any 
obvious distributional concerns. That is, in virtually all of our analyses across 
three separate analytical approaches, our results imply that increases in a 
school’s percentage of Black, non-white, low-income, or male students do 
not systematically correlate with increases in the school’s reporting rates to 
law enforcement agencies.172 
  
 
 171 See Derek C. Briggs, Causal Inference and the Heckman Model, 29 J. EDUC. & 
BEHAVIORAL STATS. 397, 399–400, 403–04 (2004) (noting the Rho test statistic’s sensitivity 
to model selection); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State 
Courts? An Empirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL STUDIES 121, 146 
(2009) (same). 
 172 The only exception involves a school’s percentage of low-income students in the non-
violent student incident context (tbl.4, model 2). 
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Table 5: Selection Models of the Rate (per 100 students) of School Reports 
of All and Non-Violent Student Discipline Incidents to Law Enforcement 





Rate of school police reports (per 100 students)     
 









School student:teacher ratio -0.00** (0.00) -0.00** (0.00) 
School student mobility % (in/out) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 
School urban. scale (rural-to-urban) -0.06 (0.07) -0.02 (0.02) 
School disorder report rate (per 100) 0.24** (0.08) 0.04** (0.01) 
School area crime scale (lo-to-hi) 0.01 (0.11) 0.06 (0.04) 
School student enrollment 0.00 (0.00) 0.00** (0.00) 
Elementary school (1=yes) -0.67** (0.19) -0.50** (0.05) 
Violent incident report req. (1=yes) -0.38 (0.38) 0.10 (0.08) 
Non-violent incident report req. (1=yes) -0.27* (0.12) -0.20** (0.05) 
School poverty % -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
School nonwhite % 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
School Black % -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
School male % -0.02 (0.02) -0.00 (0.00) 
School dist. mean per pupil spending -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
  Constant 2.46* (1.01) 0.47** (0.16) 
Any student incident at school? (1=yes) 
 
    
SRO/police at school (1=yes) 0.07 (0.18) 0.06 (0.18) 
School student:teacher ratio 0.03 (0.02) 0.03* (0.02) 
School student mobility % (in/out) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
School urban. scale (rural-to-urban) 0.00 (0.10) 0.00 (0.10) 
School disorder report rate (per 100) 83.72** (14.27) 84.98** (16.48) 
School area crime scale (lo-to-hi) 0.47* (0.22) 0.47* (0.22) 
School student enrollment 0.00* (0.00) 0.00* (0.00) 
Elementary school (1=yes) -0.94** (0.20) -0.88** (0.22) 
Violent. incident report req. (1=yes) 0.62 (0.39) 0.62 (0.39) 
Non-violent. incident report req. (1=yes) -0.29 (0.22) -0.24 (0.23) 
School poverty % 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 
School nonwhite % -0.01* (0.00) -0.01* (0.00) 
School Black % -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
School male % 0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
School district mean per pupil spending -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
  Constant -1.33 (0.72) -1.17 (0.74) 
Rho 0.19 (0.20) -0.14 (0.35) 
N (raw) 1,890  1,890  
NOTES: Model 1 explores all student disciplinary incidents; model 2 only non-violent 
incidents. For both models, the first-stage models whether a school experienced any 
recorded student disciplinary incidents. The second-stage models the rate (per 100 
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students) of school reports of all and non-violent student incidents to law 
enforcement agencies in models 1 and 2, respectively. Robust standard errors, 
clustered on school district, in parentheses. The models were estimated using the 
“heckman” command in Stata (v.16.1) and SSOCS weighted data. * p<0.05; ** 
p<0.01. 
SOURCES: U.S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics, 2015–2016 School Survey 
on Crime and Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bureau, 2016 Public 
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance File (2016). 
C. THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CONTEXT 
Throughout our analyses we consistently find that the elementary school 
setting corresponds with a reduced likelihood of school referrals to law 
enforcement agencies. As the descriptive results in Table 6 illustrate, 
elementary school law enforcement agency referral rates consistently lag 
behind middle and high school rates. Moreover, this general finding persists 
across at least two separate administrations of the SSOCS survey (2009–2010 
and 2015–2016 school years). Indeed, if anything, Table 6 evidences a 
decline in elementary school referrals between the 2009–2010 and 2015–
2016 school years. 
At one level these descriptive findings are intuitive, expected, and, 
frankly, refreshing. Given elementary school students’ tender years, at least 
as compared to their middle- and high school counterparts, we expected (if 
not hoped) to find that elementary schools were a less likely location for 
recorded student disciplinary incidents that might culminate in law 
enforcement agency referrals.173 Indeed, results in Table 6 support our 
intuition and illustrate that the average number of recorded student 
disciplinary incidents (the universe of student disciplinary matters from 
which school administrators decide which student incidents warrant a referral 
to law enforcement agencies) in elementary schools both declined over time 
and in all instances lagged behind the average number of recorded student 
incidents in middle and high schools. Thus, our prior findings evidencing 
elementary schools’ comparatively lower student discipline referral rates 
make sense insofar as this outcome may reflect the comparatively fewer (and, 
 
 173 We are mindful, of course, that arrests of young children sometimes do occur and, 
when they do, often capture the attention of the nation and draw particular concern. See, e.g., 
Handcuffed 5-Year-Old Sparks Suit, CBS NEWS (Apr. 25, 2005, 9:40 AM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/handcuffed-5-year-old-sparks-suit/ [https://perma.cc/J6D9-
AJ7S]; Bob Herbert, 6-Year-Olds Under Arrest, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/09/opinion/09herbert.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2ULY-
UPJH]; see also Jesselyn McCurdy, Targets for Arrest, in FROM EDUCATION TO 
INCARCERATION: DISMANTLING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 86, 90–93 (Anthony 
Nocella, Priya Parmar & David Stovall eds., 2014). 
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we presume, less severe) recorded student disciplinary incidents in 
elementary schools. If so, whether this outcome is a consequence of an 
SRO/police presence at elementary schools or a reduced base rate of adverse 
student incidents, or some complex interaction of both factors, however, 
remains unclear. 
 
Table 6: Rates of School Reports of Student Disciplinary Incidents to Law 
Enforcement Agencies Over Time (2009–2010/2015–2016) 
 2009-2010 2015-2016 
 Mean N (raw) Mean N (raw) 
Elementary Schools:     
Total num. recorded student discip. incidents 12.75 630 8.92 470 
School rptd. one or more incident to pol. (1=yes) 0.44 630 0.30 470 
Rate of school police rpts. (per 100) [all] 0.35 630 0.35 470 
Rate of school police rpts (per 100) [non-viol.] 0.19 630 0.08 470 
     
Middle and High Schools:     
Total num. recorded student discip. incidents 37.57 1,800 27.75 1,430 
School rptd. one or more incident to pol. (1=yes) 0.85 1,800 0.76 1,430 
Rate of school police rpts. (per 100) [all] 2.26 1,800 1.38 1,430 
Rate of school police rpts (per 100) [non-viol.] 1.07 1,800 0.68 1,430 
NOTES: Reported means derive from the SSOCS weighted data. 
SOURCES: U. S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics, 2015–2016 School 
Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS); U. S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. 
Statistics, 2009–2010 School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS-10). 
Even though results in Table 6 suggest that threats to elementary school 
safety likely declined between the 2009–2010 and 2015–2016 school years, 
we remain mindful of the 2012 tragedy in Newton, CT, where semi-
automatic gunfire in the Sandy Hook Elementary School claimed the lives of 
26 individuals, including 20 six and seven year-old school children.174 Insofar 
as such unfathomable tragedies can set into motion a series of expected and 
unexpected legal and policy outcomes, how such a horrific event (and others) 
may inform elementary school administrators going forward about initiating 
or enhancing a SRO/police presence at their schools remains unclear. 
On the one hand, we could easily envision elementary schools electing 
to initiate or “beef-up” any pre-existing SRO/police presence if, perhaps, for 
no other reason than to help “send a message” or demonstrate that they are 
 
 174 See, e.g., Sandy Hook Shooting: What Happened?, CNN (last visited Mar. 6, 2021), 
https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2012/12/us/sandy-hook-timeline/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/UUZ2-EDCZ] . 
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“doing something” in terms of school safety.175 Such a gesture may help allay 
public, parental, or schoolchildren’s concerns about safety and security at 
their elementary schools.176 As well, to the extent that a general public safety 
risk (real or perceived) has, on net, increased over time, elementary school-
age children, given their tender years, seem especially vulnerable to the 
consequences of any decay in school safety or increase in school crime or 
violence. Finally, to the extent that external dedicated funding exists for 
SRO/police for any participating schools,177 we can also easily envision 
elementary schools electing to take on (or enhance) an SRO/police presence 
for the narrow purpose of gaining an “extra” set of adult hands to generally 
assist at a school rather than to address any objective school safety, crime, or 
security concerns.178 
Given how the elementary and non-elementary school contexts differ, 
we felt it prudent to look more closely at the elementary school context in 
isolation. To this end, we re-ran our basic logistic regression models (Table 
3) on the subset of elementary schools. Interestingly, and as our findings in 
Table 7 make clear, what persists across all school levels is that increases in 
student disorder rates as well as enrollment correspond with systemic 
increases in the likelihood that an elementary school reported a student 
incident to law enforcement agencies. The major change—and surprise—is 
that in the elementary school setting, a school’s SRO/police presence does 
not correlate with the school’s reporting rate. Another surprise is that for 
elementary schools, a decrease in a school’s percentage of boys correlates 
with an increase in the school’s rate of law enforcement referrals. Our 
surprise flows from comparing this finding with numerous assertions in the 
scholarly and popular literatures about how school discipline policies and 
practices disproportionately disadvantage boys.179 
 
 175 See TRAVIS III & COON, supra note 95, at 85 (analyzing an array of reasons schools 
include SROs). 
 176 See AARON KUPCHIK, THE REAL SCHOOL SAFETY PROBLEM: THE LONG-TERM 
CONSEQUENCES OF HARSH SCHOOL PUNISHMENT 28 (2016) (explaining that “SRO programs 
are very popular among parents, teachers, and school administrators” because “[t]hey offer a 
sense of comfort and security, provide a first-responder already on campus in case of 
emergency, and can advise school administrators on legal matters”); see also Monahan & 
Torres, supra note 81, at 2–3. 
 177 See supra notes 103–106 and accompanying text. 
 178 See CURRAN, FISHER, VIANO & KUPCHIK, supra note 69, at 27–28 (noting an array of 
reasons motivating schools’ decisions to include an SRO/police presence). 
 179 See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, What Men? The Essentialist Error of the ‘End of Men’, 93 
B.U. L. REV. 1205, 1216–22 (2013); Jayanti Owens, Early Childhood Behavior Problems and 
the Gender Gap in Educational Attainment in the United States, 89 SOC. EDUC. 236, 253–54 
(2016); Camera, supra note 19. See generally CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, THE WAR AGAINST 
 
2021] "DEFUND THE (SCHOOL) POLICE"? 767 
 
Table 7: Logistic Regression Models of Whether an Elementary School 
Reported a Student Discipline Incident to a Law Enforcement Agency 
 (1) (2) (3) 
SRO/police at sch. (1=yes) 1.36 (0.29) 1.36 (0.33) ---  
Total SRO/police at school   ---  1.12 (0.14) 
School student:teacher ratio   1.00 (0.02) 1.00 (0.02) 
School student mobility % (in/out)   1.00 (0.01) 1.00 (0.01) 
School urban. scale (rural-to-urban)   1.21 (0.14) 1.20 (0.14) 
School disorder report rate (per 100)   1.32* (0.15) 1.31* (0.15) 
School area crime scale (lo-to-hi)   1.34 (0.30) 1.32 (0.30) 
School student enrollment   1.00* (0.00) 1.00* (0.00) 
Violent. incident report req. (1=yes)   1.03 (0.37) 1.03 (0.37) 
Non-violent incident report req. (1=yes)   0.62 (0.18) 0.61 (0.18) 
School poverty %   1.01 (0.01) 1.01 (0.01) 
School nonwhite %   1.00 (0.01) 1.00 (0.01) 
School Black %   0.99 (0.01) 0.99 (0.01) 
School male %   0.98* (0.01) 0.98* (0.01) 
School district mean per pupil spending   1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
       
Constant 0.37** (0.05) 0.26 (0.23) 0.28 (0.25) 
Pseudo R2 0.00  0.11  0.10  
N (raw) 470  460  460  
NOTES: Whether a school reported a student disciplinary incident to law enforcement 
agencies (1=yes). Robust standard errors, clustered on school district, in parentheses. 
The models were estimated using the “logistic” command in Stata (v.16.1) and used 
SSOCS weighted data. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
SOURCES: U.S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics, 2015–2016 School Survey 
on Crime and Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bureau, 2016 Public 
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance File (2016). 
 
When we transition to more granular analyses of school referral rates 
(Table 8), we find that for elementary schools, once again, nothing about the 
magnitude of a school’s SRO/police presence statistically corresponds with 
a school’s reporting rate. We also note that school enrollments influence 
recedes from statistical significance. Increases in school disorder rates, by 
contrast, continue to correlate with school referral rates in the expected 
direction, though not for non-violent incidents. Finally, the counter-intuitive 
(for us, anyway) finding that a decrease in an elementary school’s percentage 
 
BOYS: HOW MISGUIDED FEMINISM IS HARMING OUR YOUNG MEN (2000) (arguing that schools 
and their disciplinary policies and processes disadvantage boys more than girls). 
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of boys correlates with an increase in the school’s reporting rate for all 
student disciplinary incidents persists.180 
 
Table 8: Fractional Response Regression Models of Elementary School 
Report Rates For All and Non-Violent Student Discipline Incidents to Law 
Enforcement Agencies  
 All Incidents Non-violent 
Incidents 
Total SRO/police at school 0.87 (0.18) 1.16 (0.18) 
School student:teacher ratio 1.01 (0.03) 1.02 (0.02) 
School student mobility % (in/out) 1.00 (0.01) 1.00 (0.01) 
School urban. scale (rural-to-urban) 1.01 (0.13) 1.12 (0.23) 
School disorder report rate (per 100) 1.21** (0.04) 1.09 (0.05) 
School area crime scale (lo-to-hi) 1.24 (0.34) 1.58 (0.44) 
School student enrollment 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
Violent. incident report req. (1=yes) 0.38* (0.18) 0.84 (0.64) 
Non-violent incident report req. (1=yes) 1.20 (0.39) 0.59 (0.20) 
School poverty % 0.99 (0.01) 1.01 (0.01) 
School nonwhite % 1.00 (0.01) 1.01 (0.01) 
School Black % 1.00 (0.01) 1.00 (0.01) 
School male % 0.96** (0.01) 0.99 (0.01) 
School district mean per pupil spending 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
     
Constant 0.06 (0.07) 0.00** (0.00) 
Pseudo R2 0.16  0.05  
N (raw) 460  460  
NOTES: The dependent variables include the rate of elementary school reports for all 
student disciplinary incidents to law enforcement agencies and the rate of elementary 
school reports for only non-violent student incidents to law enforcement agencies. 
Robust standard errors, clustered on school district, in parentheses. The models were 
estimated using the “fracreg logit” command in Stata (v.16.1) and used the odds ratio 
option and SSOCS weighted data. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
SOURCES: U.S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics, 2015–2016 School Survey 
on Crime and Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bureau, 2016 Public 
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance File (2016). 
Finally, once we turn to our selection models—models that functionally 
condition out elementary schools that experienced no recorded student 
disciplinary incidents (and thus, by definition, had nothing to consider 
reporting to law enforcement agencies)—material differences between the 
 
 180 Cf. BARRY C. FELD, THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE 
CRIMINALIZING OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 156 (2017) (reporting that female juvenile arrests rates 
“increased more or decreased less” than male juvenile arrests rates for simple and aggravated 
assault during the “Get Tough Era” from 1980 to 2011). 
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elementary and middle- and high school contexts emerge with even greater 
clarity. Specifically, as the top panel of Table 9 makes clear, none of the 
earlier findings persist. The consistent absence of any statistically significant 
relation between an elementary school’s SRO/police presence and the 
elementary schools’ law enforcement agency reporting practices, once 
combined with our prior results from our entire sample of schools, implies 
that the SRO/police influence in the middle and high school contexts is 
particularly acute. 
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Table 9: Selection Models of the Rate (per 100 students) of Elementary 
School Reports of All and Non-Violent Student Discipline Incidents to Law 
Enforcement Agencies and Total Recorded Student Discipline Incidents 
 All Incidents: Non-violent Incidents: 
 (1) (s.e.) (2) (s.e.) 
Rate of school police reports (per 100 students)     
 









School student:teacher ratio -0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 
School student mobility % (in/out) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 
School urban. scale (rural-to-urban) -0.12 (0.09) 0.00 (0.02) 
School disorder report rate (per 100) 0.37 (0.21) 0.01 (0.01) 
School area crime scale (lo-to-hi) -0.07 (0.17) 0.05 (0.04) 
School student enrollment -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
Violent. incident report req. (1=yes) -0.81 (0.49) -0.02 (0.10) 
Non-violent incident report req. (1=yes) -0.01 (0.13) -0.05 (0.03) 
School poverty % -0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 
School nonwhite % 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 
School. Black % -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.00) 
School male % -0.04 (0.03) -0.00 (0.00) 
School district mean per pupil spending -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
  Constant 3.79* (1.77) 0.12 (0.17) 
Any student incident at school? (1=yes) 
 
    
SRO/police at sch.(1=yes) 0.10 (0.20) 0.06 (0.20) 
School student:teacher ratio 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 
School student mobility % (in/out) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
School urban. scale (rural-to-urban) 0.02 (0.11) 0.02 (0.11) 
School disorder report rate (per 100) 56.23** (8.31) 55.93** (5.00) 
School area crime scale (lo-to-hi) 0.48* (0.24) 0.52* (0.24) 
School student enrollment 0.00* (0.00) 0.00* (0.00) 
Violent incident report req. (1=yes) 0.56 (0.53) 0.61 (0.52) 
Non-violent incident report req. (1=yes) -0.22 (0.25) -0.18 (0.26) 
School poverty % 0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
School nonwhite % -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) 
School Black % -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
School male % 0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
School district mean per pupil spending -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
  Constant -2.06* (0.91) -1.80* (0.88) 
Rho 0.30 (0.32) -0.11 (0.26) 
N (raw) 460  460  
NOTES: Model 1 explores all student disciplinary incidents; model 2 only non-violent 
incidents. For both models, the first-stage models whether a school experienced any 
recorded student disciplinary incidents. The second-stage models the rate (per 100 
students) of school reports of all and non-violent student incidents to law 
enforcement agencies in models 1 and 2, respectively. Robust standard errors, 
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clustered on school district, in parentheses. The models were estimated using the 
“heckman” command in Stata (v.16.1) and SSOCS weighted data. * p<0.05; ** 
p<0.01. 
SOURCES: U.S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics, 2015–2016 School Survey 
on Crime and Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bureau, 2016 Public 
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance File (2016). 
CONCLUSION 
When we submit two persistent and key school-to-prison pipeline 
claims to more recent SSOCS data and more granular empirical testing, what 
emerges, on balance, is persistent support for one claim and a notable deficit 
of direct support for the other. When it comes to either whether a school 
reports any student disciplinary incidents to law enforcement agencies or a 
school’s rate of reporting, we find consistent and robust evidence—and 
across virtually all of our models—that a school’s SRO/police presence 
exerts upward influence on schools’ inclination to report and rate of 
reporting. While we did not undertake a precise or literal “replication” of 
prior studies, our core findings on these points generally comport with prior 
research on earlier SSOCS data sets.181 
A second core school-to-prison pipeline hypothesis dwells on 
distributional claims. Specifically, many critics of an increasingly 
“legalized” approach to student discipline in schools argue that increases in 
school reporting, flowing from increases in schools’ SRO/police presence, 
disproportionately involve students of color, boys, students from low-income 
households, and other vulnerable student sub-groups. As we noted 
previously, direct evidence on this specific claim from the SSOCS data set is 
simply not possible owing to the absence of any individual-level 
demographic data (e.g., race/ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status) on the 
students whose conduct triggered a possible school referral to law 
enforcement agencies. 
Despite the absence of more helpful student-level demographic data, 
our school-level findings do not hint at any obvious distributional concerns. 
Virtually all of the (few) instances where any of the traditional 
“distributional-concerning” variables achieved statistical significance 
involve gender.182 And, somewhat surprisingly, our results imply that a 
 
 181 For a brief discussion on replication studies see Michael Heise, Beyond Replication: A 
Few Comments on Spruk and Kovac and Martin-Quinn Scores, 61 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 1, 
1 (2020); William H.J. Hubbard, A Replication Study Worth Replicating: A Comment on 
Salmanowitz and Spamann, 58 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2019). 
 182 Only in one of our models (tbl.3, model 2) did we observe that an increase in the 
percentage of a school’s students in poverty corresponds with an increase in the school’s 
reporting rate of non-violent incidents. 
772 HEISE & NANCE [Vol. 111 
decrease in a school’s percentage of male students corresponds with an 
increase in school reporting rates. While our distributional-related findings 
generally comport with past empirical research using earlier SSOCS data 
sets, our findings remain somewhat at odds with received popular wisdom.183 
Because elementary schools strike us as sufficiently different than 
middle and high schools, especially when it comes to school safety and 
student discipline matters, we explored the elementary school context 
further. What we find is that our initial results underscoring the influence of 
an SRO/police presence on schools’ likelihood of referring student incidents 
to law enforcement agencies recede when we limit our analyses to elementary 
schools. What may help account for this particular finding includes a 
comparatively lower base rate of recorded student disciplinary incidents 
(their lower frequency and, we presume, lesser severity) in elementary 
schools. 
Going forward, future research on these and other, related school-to-
prison pipeline claims would benefit from improved individual-level data, 
especially as it relates to the individual students whose conduct triggered a 
possible school referral to law enforcement agencies. Another current data 
deficit relates to information on the criminal justice outcomes for those 
students whose conduct triggered a school referral to law enforcement 
agencies. While it is certainly plausible to assert that any adverse interaction 
between a student and a law enforcement agency is, on balance, negative, 
more granular data on the formal legal dispositions of these interactions 
would provide helpful information for a broader sweep of related research 
questions. 
We close by emphasizing the complexity of this issue, the increasingly 
charged area of student discipline, and the growing demands from parents, 
students, and school administrators for greater school security and order. The 
nuanced, complex, and varied interactions with a school’s SRO/police 
presence, and whether such a presence’s net costs exceed its benefits, is not 
obvious and likely varies across school districts and, perhaps, schools. While 
such decisions will inevitably involve some degree of political calculation, 
surrendering these decisions to an unusually politicized environment—and 
with total disregard for available data—invites self-defeat. Indeed, it is 
precisely moments like these, where political emotions appear especially raw 
and enflamed, when a good-faith commitment to “following data” is at a 
premium.184 
 
 183 See, e.g., George, supra note 11, at 494 (“[C]hildren of color and low-income 
children . . . are disproportionately targeted for referral and arrest by police in schools.”). 
 184 For a similar admonition see Michael Heise, Following Data and a Giant: 
Remembering Ted Eisenberg, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 8, 9 (2014). 
